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Abstract
Economic views of trust, grounded in repeated game theory and behavioral
economics experiments, largely ignore social factors such as personal relationships
between subjects. In this study, we designed a new experimental procedure, the "Social
Lending Game", in which aspects of trust are measured as a function of differing social
contexts. The procedure harnesses real-world social relationships while keeping subjects'
identities confidential. We developed relationship mining methods that categorize social
connections into trustful ties, distrustful ties, and neutral ties. Subjects in the Social
Lending Game were led to believe they were paired up with a stranger with real social
connections to them. The perceived social connections were systematically manipulated
to different types and strengths of social ties to measure the effect of social perception on
trusting behavior. Surprisingly, we found that people trust strangers as much as they trust
a friend's friend. In contrast, people distrust strangers when they are told that there exists
no social connection to the strangers. These methods and results point to a number of
future research topics that leverage social networks to reinvestigate utility theory,
trust-based decisions and risk-taking behaviors in social contexts.
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Chapter i
Introduction
i.1 Motivation
Trust, risk, and reciprocity are important factors which influence human decisions.
Trust has been defined in many ways and been studied across various disciplines [1-3].
Economic views of trust, either rooted in repeated game theory or in behavioral
economics experiments, have provided the assumptions to study trust-based behaviors [41.
However, individual choices do not appear to be consistent with these assumptions that a
rational decision maker follows [5-71. People are not exclusively self-interested. More trust
and altruism are observed between strangers than empirical assumptions predict. Is there
something missing in the economics and game theory assumptions?
The question of how to measure trust accurately and reliably is debated [8-n].
Most of the previous studies have only focused on the utility from monetary exchanges.
However, they may over-simplify trusting behavior in social exchanges. Social utilities play
as an important role as money or goods in everyday exchanges. For example, in person to
person transactions, a purchasing decision is not only based on price but also on perceived
social attributes about the seller. In the context of business, people often refer to their
social connection to others in order to gain credibility. This implies that each party in an
exchange should not be considered the same. The social accounts of individual behavior
should be taken into account while studying trust.
Yet, the previous designs of economics experiments, such as the standard trust
game, do not accommodate such social contexts involving real social networks. The
assumptions which their experimental models are based on ignore social factors such as
the personal relationships between subjects. In addition, the problem of the previous
design is that it is difficult to keep the anonymity of paired subjects while investigating
behaviors using actual social relationships between them. Furthermore, whether the
standard trust game measures trust is still controversial [12]. A new game that
incorporates social reality to examine trust-based behavior is needed.
We considered social perception rooted in the network structure of social capitals
to study trust-based decisions. Does referring to mutual friends really motivate trust and
reciprocity? How do trust-based decisions vary with different strengths of social
relationships? Are people more trusting when there exist perceived social connections?
In addition, previous studies show that trust is more essential for ensuring
cooperation between strangers than for supporting cooperation among people who
directly interact [5]. On the other hand, as virtual interactions increase, there is less to
gauge this perceived trust upon. The impression of a person can be shaped by the
perceived connections on his or her social networks. Such social perceptions may have
greater impact on trust between strangers since there is no other information to rely on.
How can we leverage social perceptions to motivate trust between strangers or entry-stage
interactions?
1.2 Contributions
We manipulated social perceptions to examine trust, risk preference, and
reciprocity. The role of perceived social connections in trust-based exchanges was
investigated using real-world social networks.
A new experimental model, embodied as the "Social Lending Game", was designed
to leverage social aspects to investigate trust. Differing from existing empirical methods,
new assumptions and predictions of trust-based behaviors are proposed. The Social
Lending Game incorporates actual social relations. The experimental model
accommodates social strategic moves of each individual. It is fundamentally different from
empirical methods in the following manners:
First, the emphasis in the Social Lending Game is on the impact of social
perception on trust-based behaviors. We developed relationship mining methods, as well
as the experimental procedures, to accurately measure trust. The relationship mining
methods can serve as a methodology to categorize social relations not only for the present
study, but for future research and theories on social ties.
Second, we identified the "free money effect" and other factors that may introduce
bias in empirical experiments. We set up a situation where subjects may suffer a loss due
to their decisions in the game. This is as opposed to the standard trust game where
subjects are offered free money and extra bonus for sure. In addition, the Social Lending
Game allows us to investigate how people use money from others. Also, the design allows
risk to be examined separate from trust, to address the ambiguity in empirical
experiments [12]. Comparing with the standard trust game, the design of the Social
Lending Game, with the investment task and the refundable participation fee, can more
accurately reflect trust, risk preferences and reciprocity.
We designed and implemented a unique economics experiment platform. In order
to integrate actual social networks in the measurement of trust, the platform is connected
with Facebook'. This platform allows the experiment to incorporate subjects' social
identities while their real identities in the experiment are kept confidential. The
experiment system, along with the unique endowment procedure and subject pairing
method, has confronted one of the biggest challenges in previous economics experiment
designs.
1 Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/ One reason we selected Facebook was that it has
been the largest social network since 2008. Also, Facebook users use real identities.
Finally, the unique data gathered from the experiment reveals the effect of social
perception on trust, risk preference and reciprocity. We found that people place trust and
reciprocity on a complete stranger as much as on a trustful friend's friend. In contrast,
people distrust a stranger when they are told that the stranger is not socially connected
through any acquaintances. Also, when the perceived connection to a stranger is through
negative social ties, people are far more likely to break trust. The results can be applied to
everyday exchanges ranging from entry-stage interactions to decisions in the virtual world.
Furthermore, the results around risk preferences are different from the prediction. When
people believe the stranger is connected through a trustful friend, they tend to make
riskier decisions; otherwise, they are risk-averse. Further results show that weather can
forecast risk preferences. The findings may serve as basis of future research on individual
trusting and risk-taking behaviors as well as interpersonal interactions.
1.3 Roadmap
The motivation and an overview of the present work are given in chapter 1.
Chapter 2 critically reviews the empirical assumptions and methods in research around
trust, with specific focus on the measurement of trust in social context. The summary of
this chapter leads to the idea that trust-based decisions should be measured when games
accommodate social strategic actions. A new experimental model that leverages social
aspects to examine trust was proposed.
Chapter 3 extends the experimental model to the research framework that
leverages social perception to study trust. The core elements in the present study are
defined. It covers the scope of trust, the dynamics underlying social perception, and the
challenges we confronted around this topic. Differing from empirical methods, new
assumptions and predictions of trust-based behaviors are proposed.
Along the lines of leveraging social perception to study trust, chapter 4 and
chapter 5 cover the two major domains of this study -- the composition of forming social
perceptions and the foundation of measuring trust. Chapter 4 describes the relationship
mining methods we developed to categorize and create social perception. Relevant
theories and methodologies around social ties are reviewed. Chapter 5 presents the Social
Lending Game. By leveraging relationship mining using actual social network data, the
Social Lending Game served as an experimental model which investigated how social
perceptions influence trust-based decisions. A critical comparison between the designs of
the Social Lending Game and of empirical economics games is provided. We identified
noisy factors such as the "free money effect" in previous studies. The fundamental
differences and uniqueness of the present game design are discussed at the end of chapter
5.
Chapter 6 describes the design and implementation of the experiment and
elucidates how the relationship mining results are integrated with the Social Lending
Game in the experiment. It demonstrates seven experimental treatments leveraging social
perceptions to examine trust. In addition, it uncovers the unique endowment procedure
and subject pairing methods. Chapter 7 gives the technical details in system design. It
shows how the experiment platform integrates actual social networks, and how the
interface accommodates the experimental treatments. Combining chapter 6 and 7, it
reveals the methodologies we developed to incorporate actual social identity while
keeping anonymity in the experiment regarding trust-based behaviors.
The findings from the experiment are shown in chapter 8. The results of this study
appear in the following sequence: First, the summary of the data and the analysis
procedure are provided. Second, we considered social perceptions polar, and analyzed its
effect on trust. Third, we argued the conclusion from previous studies regarding trust
between strangers. We formed our theory supported by experimental evidence. As
opposed to the polarity of social perception, we analyzed the strengths of social
perceptions thereafter. Finally, unexpected findings around risk preference are disclosed.
Chapter 9 concluded this work and points to directions for future research opportunities
and applications.
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Chapter 2
Measuring Trust
2.1 Empirical Assumptions
A long-established tradition in economics assumes human beings to be exclusively
self-interested. Since Adam Smith, "the vast forces of greed" and the mechanics of
self-interest have been fundamental to most economic accounts of individual behavior
and aggregate social phenomena [4]. Game theoretic modeling has also viewed agents as
being concerned with maximizing their own utility.
Based on these assumptions, several approaches were developed to measure trust,
trustworthiness and reciprocity. Since Berg, et. al proposed the trust game, it has become
the standard measurement of trust [31. However, experiments using the trust game rarely
end in the perfect Nash equilibrium. Empirical assumptions predict that self-interest
should lead to no trust in the game. Trust game experiments show substantially more
trust and altruism than equilibrium predicts.
Several papers have shown that the behavior in the trust game is affected by other
motivations besides trust in the partner. Levitt and List argue that in the lab there are
several factors, such as experimenter's scrutiny, that may induce the more socially
acceptable reactions [13]. Other factors include individual risk aversion [8-9] and altruism
[io-ni]. These results raise the question: Can we trust the trust game to accurately measure
trust?
Despite the debate over whether the standard trust game measures trust, previous
studies show that people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a trusting and
reciprocal manner [5]. This raised the bigger question: Is there something missing in the
economics and game theory assumptions?
2.2 Trust in Social Exchanges
In everyday exchanges, people decide how to bargain with one another not only
based on the transaction value, but also based on with whom they encountered. Decisions
that lead to such social exchanges usually involve trust. However, most experimental
studies that investigated trust simply match anonymous random subjects with one
another. Also, game theoretic models and most economics models assume all partners are
the same. The design in empirical games has coupled with the assumption that all players
were self-interest. It leaves no room for social accounts of individual behavior.
Several previous studies considered the influence of the partner when studying
behavior in social exchanges. Blount compared the effect of causal attributions on choice
in social decision making when the partners were perceived as humans versus machines
[14]. Ball, et. al tested for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market [15.]
Mulford, et al. examined the perceived physical attractiveness of a partner and examined
both cooperative-versus-defect choices and play-versus-not-play in a prisoner's dilemma
game setting [16]. Scharlemann, et al. investigated the influence of the facial expression (a
smile) of a partner on strategy taken in a 2-player game [17]. Slonim and Garbarino
allowed partner selection in trust game and modified dictator game[18]. Others have
focused on differences between genders in socially-oriented (selfless) behavior,
individually-oriented (selfish) behavior, and risk-taking tendency [19-21]. However, none
of them has focused on the influence of social relationships between the paired subjects.
A previous study focused on social capital and trust [22]. They looked at whether
trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with the number of common friends the
subjects have. However, their experiment was run with friends, or with people who were
asked to interact with each other beforehand, to provide a list of their common friends.
This design introduced bias from the prior knowledge about the paired partner, especially
when the paired partners were already friends before participating in the study. Research
has shown that cumulative interactions can be construed as an important form of
knowledge-based or personalized trust [23-28]. In addition, the decisions can be
influenced by other factors such as gender, facial expression, physical attractiveness, social
status, etc [15-21]. The results may not reflect the effect of social capital on trust and
trustworthiness.
Burt and Knez investigated the "third-party effects" on trust in organizational
behavior [29] They focused on social relations versus trust in a study of trust among
managers in a high-tech firm by self-report surveys. As they demonstrated, gossip
constitutes a valuable source of "second-hand" knowledge about others. However, as
Kramer reviewed, " The effects of gossip on trust judgments are complex and not always in
the service of rational assessment of others' trustworthiness" [30]. Also, the answers to the
standard trust questionnaire are not correlated with the trusting behavior in the standard
trust game [22, 31]. This implies that the self-report responses to do-you-trust type
questions may not be consistent with actual behavior regarding trust.
2-3 Measuring Trust in Social Contexts
Humans are social animals, therefore trust should be considered in social context.
Previous evidence shows that trust is a form of social intelligence [32]. However, few of the
previous studies have focused on social connection between the paired partners when
studying trust-based decisions. What have been missing in empirical measurement of
trust were the social accounts of individual behavior.
As game theory and traditional economic assumptions failed to rationalize trusting
behavior, social action should be considered as rational behavior. Previous research has
introduced and manifested social utility in utility function curvature [33]. Other research
has estimated social utility functions in different contexts[34]. Extending the work on
social utility, Loewenstein and Thompson had manipulated social relationship to examine
interpersonal comparisons regarding the preferences for outcomes to self and others [35]-
Although this study is not focused on trust, they incorporate social utility into account to
study decision making in interpersonal contexts.
Past experiments using the standard trust game and the dictator game have
over-simplified the conditions such that they neglect the social aspects in decision-making
[3, 36]. Social perceptions of people who are involved in the decisions should not be
decoupled from the measurements of utility while studying trust.
Trust-based decisions should be measured when games accommodate social
strategic moves, by introducing a social context in the experimental models. The present
research considers social perceptions to study trust, reciprocity, and risk preference.
Further discussions are given in following chapters.
Chapter 3
Leveraging Social Perception to
Study Trust
3.1 Scope
We leveraged social aspects to examine trust, reciprocity, and risk preferences.
Trust has been defined in many ways across various disciplines [1-2]. In the present study,
we focus on trust in regard of material exchanges. This is as opposed to nonmaterial
things such as trust in knowledge exchange, morals, love, etc. As one of the most
important social aspects in everyday exchanges, we considered "social perception" which
is rooted in the network structure of social capitals to study trust-based decisions.
In this study, social perception refers to the perception of interpersonal relations.
The fundamental dimensions underlying social perception is discussed in section 3.2. We
focus on the impression formed from perceived social connections between people. This
research addresses the questions: How do trust-based decisions vary with different
strengths of social connections? How do they change with various social distances in
social structure?
The influence of social perception on trust-based behaviors was examined in our
experimental model. One of the biggest challenges is how to keep the anonymity of paired
subjects while investigating behaviors based on actual social relations between them.
Previous studies acquire the subjects' social relationships to one another by self reporting
[22, 30]. However, such methods sacrifice anonymity and bring in factors that influence
trusting behavior between paired subjects. Although other research keep the anonymity to
ensure the credibility of experiment results, they have no means to incorporate social
connections into account [3]. There exists a trade-off between retaining anonymity
between the paired subjects and incorporating social reality.
To confront this challenge, we conducted our experiment with human subjects
who were strangers. We incorporated their actual social network on Facebook and
subjects were led to believe they were playing with a stranger with real social connections
to them. We developed the relationship mining methods to categorize their social
relationships to their real friends. Furthermore, we manipulated the relations between
paired subjects to examine how social perceptions influence trusting behaviors.
In addition, we identified the effect on trust, risk preferences and reciprocity
exclusively from social perceptions. Previous study has included subjects who were already
friends or acquaintances [22]. As discussed earlier, these results may be influenced by
prior knowledge of other perceived social attributes, such as the other party's social status,
communities they belongs to, etc. These social factors were excluded from our study to
prevent bias. We exclusively focused on the effect of social perception, regarding
perceived social connections. To do this, we conducted the experiment with complete
strangers and they were not allowed to meet each other during the entire experiment. The
social distance between people in this study was characterized following the definitions of
"degrees of separation" in social networks [37-38]. The social perceptions examined were
perceptions of people who were in 2 or more degrees of separation. We assumed that on
the basis of their first degree connections, people formed social perceptions of one
another and hence influenced trust.
Leveraging actual social network to study trust between strangers also allows us to
investigate interactions in the entry stage. It is common that when people first meet, they
introduce each other by referring to possible mutual friends. In business contexts, people
tend to strengthen their bond by referring to their shared social connections among each
other. However, does acknowledging mutual friends really strengthen social bond? Are
people more trusting when there are perceived social connections? These questions were
addressed by means of leveraging social perception to study trust.
3.2 Social Perception
Bourdieu first defined the concept of social capital as the following: "The aggregate
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" [39]
According to Bourdieu's definition, social capital consists of the following two
decomposable elements: first, the social relationship itself that allows individuals to claim
access to resources possessed by their associates; second, the amount and quality of those
resources. On the basis of Bourdieu's definition, Portes concluded that "Transactions
involving social capital tend to be characterized by unspecified obligations, uncertain time
horizons, and the possible violation of reciprocity expectations" [40].
As several studies have pointed out, social capital facilitates individual's
occupational attainment [41-43]. Other studies show that it improves companies' business
operations [44-46]. Social capital is found to be significantly related to resource exchange
and product innovation [47]. Most of the past studies have focused on the value created by
social capital. However, few of them examine the potential risk of social capital or
investigate the impact of social capital on trust.
Perceived social capital belonging to a person forms a certain impression of
him/her. As the saying goes, "birds of a feather flock together." As the social perception is
established, it serves as the basis for people to make assumptions to categorize others,
predict behaviors, and make decisions thereafter. In this study, social perception refers to
the perception of social capital that one possesses. The impression of that person can be
shaped by the perceived connections on his or her social networks.
3-3 Assumptions and Predictions
We assumed that such social perceptions altered trust. Furthermore, we focused
on the impression formed from perceived social connections between one another. These
perceived social connections could be acquaintances, close friends, or enemies. Since
there is no other information to rely upon, the influence of social perception on trust is
even more effective in the entry stage interactions or between strangers.
How far can social perception be carried over through a social networks and
influence trust? In everyday exchanges, a common strategy to get a good bargain is to
leverage social connections as referrals. We assumed that social perception of whom one
encountered with dominated the uncertainty where trust based upon. However, does
social capital always motivate trust? Are there risks of having social capital?
We predicted social perception altered trust, risk preferences and reciprocity in
two manners. First, we considered the social distance on a given social network. The social
perception formed based upon one's social capital would have different strength of impact
on trust according to the distance. The increase of trust should be proportional to the
social distance.
In addition, social perception should be further considered polar. Positive (trustful)
social perception induced stronger trusting behavior, while negative (distrustful) social
perception damaged trust. Neutral social perception should lead to baseline behaviors,
where observed trust should be in between those with trusting and distrusting
perceptions.
Chapter 4
Relationship Mining
4.1 Purpose
The purpose of relationship mining is to categorize the social connections on a
given social network. In order to investigate the impact of social perceptions on trust,
reciprocity and risk preference, we manipulated social perceptions into different types and
strengths. In this study, we considered social perceptions rooted in the network structure
of social capitals. In other words, the impressions of one's first degree friends are projected
onto strangers and hence form the perceptions of the strangers. Since the social
perceptions are formed based upon the social capital one possesses, it is important to not
only identify the social capital one has, but also categorize it according to trust.
We developed the relationship mining methods that categorize social relationships
to one's first degree friends according to trust. The relationship mining results serve as the
basis for manipulating social perceptions in various experimental treatments in the
"Connected Strangers Experiment" (see section 6.3.3 for the experiment design).
In addition, the relationship mining allows us to incorporate actual social
networks while keeping the anonymity of paired subjects in the experiment. To do this,
the social relations of the social capital subjects have are genuine, while the social
relations beyond 2 or more degrees of separation were manipulated to create various
social perceptions in different experimental conditions. With the relationship mining
methods, we categorized real-world social connections into trustful tie, distrustful tie, and
neutral tie. By leveraging the actual social relationships, we manipulated social
perceptions to investigate trust-based decisions.
4.2 Relationship Mining Methods
4.2.1 Social Ties Conditioned on Trust
This study scoped trust in terms of trust in monetary exchanges (Chapter 3). We
categorized the relations of one's first degree social capitals regarding the same aspect of
trust - monetary exchanges. Previous studies provided quantitative measurement of social
ties [48-49]. Recent studies focused on predictive models that map virtual social networks
to the strength of social ties by analyzing quantitative variables on social media sites
[50-51]. The results may represent tie strength well, but the correlation of tie strength and
trust are vaguely seen. In addition, the data collected from social media sites may provide
an objective view for quantitative analysis of tie strength. However, such methods may not
represent the actual level of trust a subject has.
In order to identify and categorize the social ties in terms of trust, we developed
the relationship-mining survey. The survey questions are scenarios involving the subject
and their actual friends. The survey questions for relationship mining are as follows:
1. Will you lend $ioo to Thomas if he asks?
o Yes.
o No.
2. Do you believe Andrew will return the $ioo borrowed from you?
o Yes.
o No.
o I'm not sure.
3. You have an urgent need of $100. Will you ask Sophia to lend you some
money?
o Yes.
o No.
4. Jessica is in a rush and needs your help......
Jessica gives you sioo that her friend will come pick up from you within
30 minutes. However, no one shows up. You decide not to wait for the
friend and keep the sioo in your wallet. On your way home, the sioo gets
stolen! You will ...
o say sorry to Jessica and may or may not return the entire $100.
o pay back Jessica the full amount of money by all means.
o think that $100 between you two is not a big deal. Either of you will
cover it.
We incorporated actual social networks of each subject on Facebook. To gain an
adequate amount of information about one's social capital without introducing bias in the
survey, forty friends were randomly picked and displayed in a random sequence. Each
survey question is with regard to a friend, while the corresponding name, picture, social
network, and further information of that friend are displayed along with the question on a
web-based interface. Subjects' identities and their responses in the survey are kept secret.
This method allows us to gather comprehensive information of one's social capital and
keep their identity confidential. Also, the data collected is from the subjective view of each
person, and would represent their impressions of each of their friends in terms of trust.
4.2.2 Algorithm for Categorizing Social Relationships
Based on the relationship mining results, the social connections between a person
and his/her first degree friends were categorized into a trustful tie, a distrustful tie, or a
neutral tie. We further differentiated trust regarding lending money and borrowing money.
Questions i and 2 in the relationship-mining survey are to indentify the lender's respect of
trust, while questions 3 and 4 are with respect to the borrower. The algorithm for
categorizing the social relationships is as follows:
For trust regarding lending,
If ((the answer to Qi is "Yes") & (the answer to Q2 is "yes")) {
The relationship == trustful; }
else if ((the answer to Qi is "No") & (the answer to Q2 is NOT "I'm not sure") {
The relationship == distrustful; }
else { The relationship == neutral; }
For trust regarding borrowing,
If ((the answer to Q3 is "Yes") & (the answer to Q4 is NOT "i")) {
The relationship == trustful; }
else if ((the answer to Q3 is "No" ) & (the answer to Q4 is "1")) {
The relationship == distrustful; }
else {The relationship == neutral; }
The relationship-mining survey incorporating actual social networks, in
conjunction with the categorizing algorithm, allows us to identify a subject's social capital
and to classify his/her social connections in terms of trust. The results serve as the basis
for the Social Lending Game (Chapter 5) where a pair of strangers would participate as a
borrower and a lender. The above algorithm of trust regarding borrowing is applied for a
subject who participated as a borrower, and that of trust regarding lending is applied for a
lender.
4-3 Manipulating Social Perception
Using the results from relationships mining, we generated the "Social Connection
Graph" (Figure i). The Social Connection Graph illustrates the social relations among
strangers who participate as lender-borrower pairs in the social lending experiment.
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Figure i. Types of social connections for generating the Social Connection Graph.
Three types of social connections are generated: the trustful connection, the
distrustful connection, and no connection. As illustrated in Figure 1, for example, the
subject and participant i had a common friend, David. Also, the degree of separation
between the paired strangers was two. Since David was identified as a trustful friend
according to the relationship mining results, David was a trustful connection between the
subject and participant 1. Similarly, Ben connecting the subject and participant 2 had been
categorized as a distrustful friend, and the degree of separation was two. This formed the
I IITrustful () I Distrustful (-)I
Trustful(+)
distrustful connection. If there is no connection between the two strangers, no mutual
friend will be displayed.
In addition, various strengths of social connection are generated. As shown in
Figure 1, participant 3 was four degrees away from the subject, and their mutual friend
Jane had been categorized to be a trustful friend. The first degree friend is the basis when
forming the social perception. To investigate the impact of strengths of social connections,
as opposed to types of social connections, we considered only a trustful tie as the first
degree connection when varying the strengths of social connection. Social connections of
3 degrees to 6 degrees of separation were generated, as displayed in Figure 2. The first
degree friend is the social capital identified in the relationships mining, so only the first
degree friend is listed on the Social Connection Graph. Other friends beyond first degree
are displayed as anonymous, including the other participants.
3 Steps 4 Steps 6 Steps 6 Steps
Friend's Friend Friend's Friend Friends Friend Partieipant D
I Stop 2 Steps_________
Friend's Friend Friends Friend Participant C
you s4d Sadi (MiT) Sajd sadl's Friend
Friend's Friend Participant B
Participant A
Figure 2. Different strengths of social connections in the Social Connection Graph.
By arranging a different first degree friend on the Social Connection Graph,
different types of social connections between paired anonymous subjects can be arranged.
By tuning the degrees of separation between the two subjects, the strengths of the social
connection between them can be changed. The social perceptions one may have of the
paired participant can be manipulated by arranging a specific Social Connection Graph,
which served as the basis of different treatments in this experiment using the Social
Lending Game (see Chapter 6 and Figure 17).
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Chapter 5
Social Lending Game
5.1 Purpose
The Social Lending Game is designed to model trust, reciprocity and risk
preferences. By leveraging relationship mining using actual social network data (Chapter
4), the Social Lending Game serves as an experimental model which investigates the effect
of social perceptions on trust-based decisions. In addition, the design decomposes
decisions made by anonymously paired lenders/borrowers, to further examine self-other
discrepancies in risk preference.
The experiment model of the Social Lending Game considers realistic social
lending situations. Unlike empirical economics games, such as the standard trust game
where the experimenter tripled the money between two players, the money sent from one
subject in the Social Lending Game may be increased or may be gambled away due to the
other subject's decisions [31. The Social Lending Game with the investment task is a
unique design that fundamentally distinguished the experimental model from empirical
experiment design. With which, the Social Lending Game models trust, risk-preferences,
and reciprocity in an accurate sense, it also investigates the effect of social perceptions.
5.2 Social Lending Game Design
As an experimental model for testing the hypotheses, we considered the simplest
social landing situation, where the financial transactions occur between one borrower and
one lender.
Figure 3 depicts the game tree of the Social Lending Game. The borrower and the
lender are paired up in the initial stage. Each of them is endowed with same amount of
initial capital Mo. A unique endowment method was designed for the experiment in order
to ensure subjects consciously regard the money as their own money (see section 6.2 for
the endowment method.)
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Figure 3. The game tree of the Social Lending Game.
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The borrower and lender are not allowed to choose each other. They are paired up
based on their social relationships on social networks. According to the relationship
mining results, we identified their relationship regarding trust using actual social network
data (Chapter 4). In the Social Lending Game, a borrower is paired up with a specific
lender who is a stranger, but could be socially connected through their common friends
(see Chapter 6 for further discussion on subject pairing.) The paired-up lender and
borrower are not allowed to meet each other. This is to keep them as strangers during the
game. Although they are strangers to each other, they are given the Social Connection
Graph and corresponding information (Figure 17 and section 6.3-3), showing who their
common friends are, and how far they could be linked to each other on their social
network. In the experiment, the social connection information was given before and
during their decisions.
The lender makes the lending decision, which is used to model trust as a function
of social perception. The decisions made by the borrower include an investment decision
and a repayment decision. The investment decision is to test the hypotheses of risk
preferences. The repayment decision is to model reciprocity.
5.2.1 The Investment Task
As the most realistic social lending situation, the borrower is in need of money to
remove his current deficit, while the lender may expect to increase her future utility from
making the loan. In the Social Lending Game, we considered a borrower who needs
money for making an investment. A great investment opportunity is provided, where a
return better than the annual average return of stock market investments could be earned.
The investment simply consists of two options:
Investment option 1 is a high risk-high return investment.
Investment option 2 is a low risk-low return investment.
As the simplest investment situation, the borrower only has to pick one of the
investment options, using the entire loan (M,) given from the lender. The investment
return (N) is calculated based on given winning possibilities. With investment option 1,
there is a 50% risk to lose the entire loan (N=o), and a 50% chance to win 250% in return
(N=2.5M,). With investment option 2, the risk to lose the entire loan is io% (N=o), with a
90% chance to gain 20% profit (N=1.2M 1).
Figure 4 is the screen illustrating the investment options for borrowers in the
Social Lending Game. On the same screen, a borrower can see the Social Connection
Graph showing the connection from them to the lender on social networks. Before they
can start to make their investment choice, the borrower has to pay a "participation fee" in
order to enter the investment. The reason for the participation fee arrangement is to
model how people use the money of others. Would social perception change the
risk-taking behavior? See section 5.2.2, "Spending Others' Money" for further discussion.
You have $100
Progrem theugh the entire experiment
Progres through the current section
The other participant may choose to make you a loan so that you may make an investment. Aocording to your social nebtWk on Facebook. the following shoew your relatioship to other padicipants.
We found that the participard is 3 steps awayfrom you, connocting thwough one of your friends, Peter Valeiras (Columbia).
1 stp 2 Sps 3 seps
Participant
Peter Valeras (Columbia)
Friend A
You and the participants do not know each other. Your identities and responses will be kept secret. Furthermore, no data will be pulished on Facebook or released to your friend.
You have $100. Now Ws your chance to make an Investment to win up to 2.5 timesI
Before you start....
In this round, the system has paired you up with the other participant as shown above. Please let the experimenter know if you are not sure who your partner is.
This linestment iequires you to pay a fully refundable $100 participation fee. (Your own $100 will be paid as the participation fee, which will be retumed to you at the end
of this round.)
We understand that this will leave you with no capital available with which to invest. However, you will receive a certain amount of money from a participant that you are paired up
with in this round. The person has $100 available and will decide to send you some, all or none of it for you to invest.
Note: The person sees the same picture as above, so he/she does not know who you are, The person will never find out what your investment decision is. How you use the
money is completely up to you.
Insiucdon to the Investment:
You have two options to make your liement:
Option 1 is a high risk-high return investment, with 50% chance to win 250%
Option 2 is a low risk-low return investment, with 90% chance to make a 20% retum.
For example, if you invest $100, and
choose option 1:
You have 50% chance to be paid back $250 and 50% chance to lose
choose option 2:
You have 90% chance to gain $20 and 10% chance to lose.
Keep in mind that you and the person do not know each other. Your identities and responses will be kept secret
Please click "Got" when you are ready to invest. The system will take your $100 for the participation fee, and wilt send a money request to the person who is paired up with you in
this round.
Figure 4. The investment task screen in the Social Lending Game.
5.2.2 Spending Others' Money
The borrower is given an initial capital M.. However, we purposely put the
borrower in the situation that they do not have enough money to invest, by doing the
following:
In order to make the investment, the borrower is required to pay a fully refundable
"participation fee" before they could continue. The participation fee costs the same
amount as the initial capital Mo. In other words, the borrower's own capital is frozen until
the end of the investment. At that time, the participation fee (MO) is returned along with
the investment principal and profit (N) (Figure 3). This leaves the borrower with no capital
available with which to invest, and hence the borrower has to use money from a stranger
to make the investment.
The reasons for charging the borrower the participation fee and leaving them with
no money to invest are described as follows:
First, either investment option has a certain risk to lose the money (M,) borrowed
from the stranger. The fully refundable participation fee is in fact collateral that ensures
the borrower to have the ability to pay back (Figure 3). Lenders are also aware of this
before they make their lending decisions. The lender's screen reads "The borrower needs
more capital to make an investment to earn up to 50%. Their own capital (M.) is paid for a
refundable participation fee, which will be returned to them with the investment profit.
The borrower will use the money sent from you to make the investment." Thus, the
investment risk would not influence the lender's decision. The lender's only risk is the
borrower not repaying the loan. This makes the lender's decision rely on their
understanding of the borrower, while the only information about the borrower is from the
Social Connection Graph. When a lender makes the lending decision, they may only be
influenced by the social perception of the borrower, but not by the investment risks or
other factors.
Note that when the borrower is given the investment options, the participation fee
is presented as a required fee to enter the investment. This provides them with a reason to
request the loan from the lender. This setting is fundamentally different from the
empirical methods that the money receiver receives a set of free money for no reason.
Further discussions about this are given in section 5.3.
The setting also clearly separates the other's money from the borrower's own
money. As shown in Figure 4, terms or concepts such as "collateral" are avoided in the
description about the participation fee, because collateral implies that the borrower has
the obligation to pay back. We leave the repayment decision with the borrower at the end
of the game when their own money (MO) is returned. They are asked to payback using
their own money, without being predefined as collateral. The purpose is to prevent mixing
the borrower's own money with the lender's money. They use only money from others to
invest. This allows us to investigate how people use someone else's money, as oppose to
their own money.
5.2.3 Measuring Risk Preferences
The incentive to borrow is to make an investment profit. Using the loan from the
lender, the experiment task is to model how people use money from others. How would
the risk preference be different when the lender is a complete stranger, versus the case
when the lender is a friend's friend?
To identify whether risk preferences are influenced by social perceptions, the
Social Connection Graph is given on the investment option screen (Figure 4) and on the
decision screen (Figure 5). The borrower is given only the following information:
1. The descriptions of the two investment options.
2. Through which friend the borrower can be linked to the lender.
We hypothesized that risk preferences can be influenced by social perception.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that people tend to make riskier choices when the social
connection was loose, i.e., when the lender is three steps or further, and when the
connection is a distrustful tie (Chapter 4). On the other hand, we hypothesized that safer
investment decisions would be made when using the money from connected strangers
with a strong, trustful social tie.
Progress through the entire experiment
Progres through the current section
The other participant may choose to make you a loan so that you may make an investment. According to your social netsuik on Facebook, the following shows your relationship to other paticipants.
We found that the participant Is 3 steps away from you, connecting through one of your friends, Peter Valeiras (Columbia).
I step 2 Steps 3 Seps
Participart
Peter Valeiras (Columbia)
Friend A
You and the participants do not know each other. Your Identities and responses will be kept secret. Furthermore, no daa will be published on Facebook or released to your friend.
The system has paired you with the above participant for this round.
Investment
Your $100 Is paid for the partiolpation fee. (This fe a will be returned to you at the and of this round.)
The other participant just received your money request. You will use hwisher moneyto invest.
Please make your investment decision while he/she is deciding the amount of money to give you. (from $0 to $100)
p.s. They do not know your investment decision. How you use their money Is all up to you.
Accordng to your social network on Facebook, the graph shows your relationship to the other participant paired up with you in this round.
Keep in mind that you and the participant do not know each other. Your identities and actions will be kept secret.
The other participant sees the same graph and knows your social relationship.
Please make your Investment decision:
I want to put money in
o Option 1 - high risk high return Investment, with 50% chance to win 250%.
o Option 2 - low rk- low return investment, with 90% to gain 20% profit.
Figure 5. The decision screen for the investment, to model risk preferences using money
from others, who can be socially connected as shown in the Social Connection Graph
above the investment options. The borrower's own money (M.) is locked by the
participation fee.
We purposely arranged the expectation values for the two investment options to
be close but different:
* Option 1 is a high risk-high return investment, with a 50% to win 250%.
* Option 2 is a low risk-low return investment, with a 90% chance to make a
20% return.
..........
For example, if one invests $100, by choosing option 1, they have a 50% chance to
be paid back $250 and a 50% chance to get so. By choosing option 2, they have a 90%
chance to be paid back $120 and a 1o% chance to get so.
People tend to be risk-averse [52-54]. If the two options had same expectation
values, a risk-averse agent may regard option 2 superior to option 1. We arranged the
expectation value of option 1 to be slightly better than option two, in order to compensate
for this effect.
Note that no information about the loan amount (M,) is given at this point. The
investment decision is the borrower's discretion alone. However, the size of loan from the
lender may signal trust, and may in turn change the borrower's decisions. To prevent such
an influence, the borrower is asked to make the investment decision at the same time
when the lender is sending the loan (Figure 5). This is to ensure that the investment
decision is made regardless of the size of the loan.
Progressthrough the entire experiment
Progressthrough the current section
Transferring money...
Please hold on. The other participant is still deciding how much to land you, from $0 to $100......
Your $100 is paid for the participation fee, and your investmert decision has been made.
Once he/she makes the decision, the money vAll be transfered to you and the system wili calculate your investment otcome!
Figure 6. The transaction screen. The loan amount is not revealed until after the
borrower makes their investment decision.
In addition, we arranged the transaction screen as shown in Figure 6. This way, the
loan amount (M1) from the lender is revealed only after the investment decision is made.
The system requests the lender's decision through the Internet. The money from the
lender is transferred to the borrower after this point, as shown in Figure 7. This further
separates the borrower's own capital from the lender's, to measure how people spend
money from others, and to model whether trust and reciprocity can be influenced by
social perceptions.
Progress through the entire experiment
Progress through the current section
Your capital:
We've heard back from the other participant. He/She decided to lend you $50
You have chosen investment option 1 (high risk- high return Investment, with 50% chance to win 250%).
Your original $100 is kept as the refundable fee so that only the $50 from the other participant is used to invest.
The investment has been processed
Please click "Next" to see the investment results!
Nest
Figure 7. The loan-receiving screen. The money from the lender is kept separate from the
borrower's own money.
5.2.4 Measuring Trust, with Respect to Social Perception
The lender decides whether they want to pass any of their endowment (MO) to the
borrower. The lender's decision screen is shown in Figure 8, where a Social Connection
Graph is displayed to show the social connection between the lender and the borrower.
The content of the Social Connection Graph is based on the relationship mining results
and experiment treatment. See Chapter 4 and section 6.3.3 for further descriptions. In this
example, the lender's friend Aaron knew the borrower. The borrower and the lender were
strangers and were not allowed to meet during the experiment.
You have $100.
The othe participant nseeds more capital to make an Invesitment whIch could retum up to 250%.
The other participant is making the investment decision and needs to borrow money from you.
You decide how much moeny to lend. The money from you will be used by the other participant to make the investment.
Even if the other participant lose in the investment, they still have their own $100.
At the end of the investment, the other participant will decide how much to pay you back.
The system is pairing you with one of the following participants. According to your social netmok on Faobook, the following shove your relationship to other partiolpants.
We found that:
a You know Aaron Goldin(Harvard). and Aaron Goldin (Harvard) is a friend of Partiolpant A.
* You and Participant B do not have a common friend.
" You and Participant c do not have a common friend.
You have been paired with Participant A
Parotipad A Participart B Participard c
Aaron Goldn (Harvard
you you you
Keep in mind that you and the paticipant do not know each other. Your identities and responses will be kept secret.
Please enter how much money you would like to lend, from $0 to $100 In $1 Inctements.
Id like to lend $
Next
Figure 8. The decision screen for lending, to model influences of social perceptions
on trust.
The decision screen shows the lender the following:
1. Through which friend the borrower can be linked to the lender.
.. . ................................................................
2. The borrower is in need of money to make an investment, wherein the
borrower has the chance to gain up to 2.5 times in return. The borrower will
use the money from the lender to invest.
3. Even if the borrower lost in the investment, they still had the initial
endowment (M.).
4. The borrower may share the profit with the lender or may not return the
full amount of the loan.
The lender can either transfer any amount M, (o< M, s;M.) or can decide not to
lend any money to the borrower. Any amount not transferred to the borrower is kept by
the lender. If the lender decides not to lend, they will keep the entire M,, and the
borrower receives no loan for the investment, which terminates the game. The borrower's
payoff is also Mo (Figure 3). If the lender lends M,, and the borrower repays M2, the lender's
payoff will be M. - M,+ M2. The lending decision investigates how social perception
motivates trust, which was measured by the amount lent (M,).
The incentive to lend is the potential share of profit from the borrower. Even if the
borrower loses the investment, they still have the ability (their own money) to pay back
full amount. The risk of lending is that the borrower decides not to pay back the loan. Also,
the borrower's investment decision is never revealed to the lender. The lending decision is
the lender's discretion, whether to trust the borrower. The amount (M1) is sent to the
borrower without adjustment (Figure 3). Differing from the trust game, no extra capital is
provided by the experimenter during the transaction. Comparing with the empirical
experiment, this game design further reflects trust. See section 5-3 for further discussions.
5.2-5 Measuring Reciprocity, with Respect to Social Perception
Reciprocity is measured from the borrower's repayment decision. This happens
when the investment outcome is revealed. The investment return (N) is delivered to the
borrower. At the same time, the participation fee (M) is refunded (Figure 3).
If the borrower loses in the investment (N=o), they also loses the money from the
lender (M1). The total money they have is their initial endowment M.. In other words, they
lose a stranger's money. Will they use their own money to pay back?
The other participant may choose to make you a loan so that you may make in investment. According to your social neilok on Facebook. the following shove your relationship toother participants.
We found that the participard is 3 steps away from you, connecting through one of your friends, Peter Valeirag (Columbia).
IStep 2 Seps 3 Stmp
Participad
Peter Valeiras (Columbia)
Friend A
You and the participants do not knoweach other. Your identities and responses vAill be kept secret. Furthermore, no data vAill be published on Facabook or released to your friend.
The system has paired you with the above participant for this round.
Unfortunately... you lost the $50 In the Investment.
The $100 participation fee Is now returned to you. So, the total money you have is $100. You received $50 from the other participant to make the investment.
Would you like to pay the other participant back?
Keep in mind that you and the participant do not know each other. Your identities and actions will be kept secret
I want to pay back the other participant $
(Please enter the amount from $0 to $100, in $1 increments. If you dectded not to pay back please enter 0)
Next
Figure 9. The repayment screen.
Figure 9 shows the repayment decision screen. The Social Connection Graph and
corresponding information are displayed on the same screen. In this example, the
investment is not successful (N=o), such that the borrower loses all the money from the
lender (M1=$50). The total amount of money the borrower has at this point is the refunded
participation fee (MO = $1oo). The borrower could choose not to pay back by entering so,
or by paying back some or all of their capital. The amount entered is pre-calculated in a
pop-up window before the borrower confirms this decision (Figure io). In this example,
the borrower tries to payback $50 (M2) to the lender. The borrower is considered
trustworthy by paying back the full amount (M1=M2=$50). If the borrower confirms paying
back this amount, they will suffer a loss (M2=$5o) and leave the game with the remaining
$50. The lender will get the full amount of the loan paid back and leave the game with
their entire endowment sioo (MO). The borrower may change their mind based on the
pre-calculation results. If the borrower maximizes their own utility, they will defect by
keeping their own $100 and leave the game. Therefore, the lender loses $50, and the
borrower is considered not trustworthy.
Unfortunately,,, you lostthe $0 In the Investment.
The $100 paricipation fee Is now returned to you. So, the total money you have is $100. You received $60 from the other participant to make the investment.
Would you like to pay the other participant back?
Keep in mind that you andthe participat do not know each 0
I want to pay back the other palcipant 6 50(Please enter the amount from$ 0 to $100, in $1 increments
You and the participant do not know each other. Your identities will be kept secret.
Figure io. The repayment preview screen, which clearly informs the borrower their
balance if the repayment decision is made. No money will be transferred to the
lender before their final decision is confirmed.
The investment could be successful. If the borrower wins in the investment (N>o),
the total investment return will be the money sent from the lender (M1) plus the
investment profit. They also keep their own money returned from the investment
participation fee (MO). In this situation, would they share their profit with the lender?
The repayment decision screen and preview screen are the same as Figure 9 and
Figure io, except for the amounts. The Social Connection Graph and corresponding
information are displayed to show the connection between the borrower and the lender.
The repayment decision measures reciprocity, when the investment is successful.
If the borrower shares the profit with the lender (M2 > M1), we consider the borrower as
reciprocal.
5-3 Comparing with Previous Economics Games
In the standard trust game, the money sent from player 1 is always tripled by the
experimenters and then transferred to player 2. Thus, player 2 receives 200% extra for free
for sure. Player 1 is aware of this happening, and will expect to share the free money. The
capital is not increased out of any player's effort, but automatically increases to three
times for no reason. Since the expansion of the capital is given for free, subjects may not
regard the tripled money as valuable as three times of the actual amount. Consequently,
the decision-making behavior deviates toward a tendency of giving money away more
easily. We termed such tendency the "free money effect."
Player 2 receives the money and is asked to decide whether to send any amount of
it back to player 1. Knowing that two-thirds of the money is given for free, it does not hurt
returning money back and sharing the free portion with player i. Similar concerns around
the "free money effect" are interpreted by Fehr as follows: "In a trust game, for example, a
Proposer [player 1] receives an amount of money x from the experimenter, and then can
send between zero and x to the Responder [player 2]. The experimenter then triples the
amount sent, which we term y, so that the Responder has 3y. The Responder is then free
to return anything between zero and 3y to the Proposer. It turns out that many Proposers
send money and that many Responders give back some money. Moreover, there is
frequently a positive correlation between y and the amount sent back at the individual as
well as at the aggregate level" [5].
As for player 1 in the standard trust game, bearing in mind any money sent is
tripled for free for sure, their incentive to send money is for the share of the free money
rather than trust. Thus, the money sent from player i, and the amount returned by player
2 may not actually measure trust and reciprocity as the trust game claimed.
In the Social Lending Game, we designed the borrower's investment task. This
investment decision task is the core element in the experiment model that allows the
Social Lending Game to reflect trust and reciprocity. First, the money sent from the lender
may be increased to up to 2.5 times, but this is from the borrower's action. Gaining profit
in the investment is from the borrower's effort. It takes all their initial capital MO in order
to make the investment. Also, it takes their decision to potentially increase the capital. No
free money effect is introduced by the experimenter.
Furthermore, in the Social Lending Game, the money sent from the lender may be
diminished out of the borrower's action. If the entire amount of money sent from the
lender is lost, will the borrower still repay the lender? Will this be influenced by the social
connection between them?
Anticipating this, and without the "free money effect", the lender's gauge relies on
the social perception of the paired borrower. This repayment decision, especially when
suffering a loss from their own action (as oppose to receiving free money for no reason)
measures reciprocity. Social factors are also taken into account in the measurement of
trust and reciprocity in the present game design. Comparing with the standard trust game,
the design of the Social Lending Game, with the investment task and the refundable
participation fee, can more accurately reflect trust and reciprocity.
Chapter 6
Experiment Procedure
6.1 Experimental Design Overview
We designed a behavioral experiment with different treatments to test the
hypotheses around trust-based decisions and the influences by social perceptions. The
experiment was conducted in several rooms located at the MIT Behavioral Research Lab.
We conducted the study with human subjects. They were seated in separate rooms with
doors closed. Subjects who were paired up in the same experiment were not allowed to
meet each other before, during or after the experiment.
6.1.1 Experiment Components
The experiment consisted of the following components:
Phase 1:
ia. The relationship-mining survey.
1b. The "Complete Stranger Experiment".
Phase 2:
2a. The "Connected Stranger Experiment".
2b. The Review Questionnaire.
For phase ia, we designed the relationship-mining survey and interfaced it with
actual social network on Facebook. Through our experiment system, subjects were able to
view information about their friends in real time. They answered a set of questions in
different scenarios involving their friends. Phase ib consisted of one round of the Social
Lending Game where subjects were randomly paired up with a complete stranger.
Phase 2a consisted of seven rounds of the Social Lending Game. Each round was a
separate experimental treatment, and was completely independent. A subject was paired
up with seven different strangers to participate in each of the seven rounds. Phase 2b was
a questionnaire that probed subjects' decision-making strategy and reviewed their
experience. It was not presented unless they completed all other phases.
The experiment procedure is illustrated in Figure ii. The entire process of phase 1
and phase 2 took around 30 minutes each. Phase i and phase 2 were separated by at least
seven days. After completing phase 1, subjects were required to complete a demographic
survey (see Appendix C) Also, they were asked to fill out a participation payment form, no
payment was made until the end of phase 2. All the money endowed in the experiment
was in chips, and the amount could be increased or decreased based on their decisions.
We developed a unique endowment method, described in section 6.2.
Phase 1
Relationship-nining Survey <3omin. -
Relationship Mining
Pairing up subjects
Phase 2
Connected Stranger Experiment(30min}4-
Figure ii. The experiment procedure.
6.1.2 Social Network in Sequential Experiments
We developed a system and interface for behavior experiments involving social
networks (see section 6.6 and Chapter 4). In experiment phase 1 and phase za, subjects
were required to use their real Facebook identities to log in to Facebook through our
experiment's interface. This allows actual social networks to be displayed on the
experiment's interface in real time. In addition, the use of actual social network data along
with subject's behavior recorded in the experiment, allow us to conduct the relationship
mining (Chapter 4).
The basis of the treatments in experiment phase 2a is the Social Connection Graph.
It was constructed according to the results from the relationship mining using the data
from the relationship-mining survey. In other words, the content of experiment phase 2a
relied upon phase 1a. They both were based on the relationship mining results from actual
social network data.
The Social Connection Graphs, such as Figure 17, Figure 18 and Figure 19,
illustrated the social relationship between two subjects who were paired up in the game.
We manipulated the graph by replacing the pictures and changing degrees of separation.
To change the types of social ties, we changed the first degree friends on the graph by
replacing a trustful friend with a distrustful friend. The trustful or distrustful relationships
were categorized from the relationship mining. Seven types of Social Connection Graphs
were created for the seven treatments in the Connected Strangers Experiment (Section
6.3-3).
6.1.3 Pretest-Posttest Design Combining with Repeated Measures
Our experiment can be seen as a Pretest-posttest experiment design combined
with repeated measures [55-56]. The Complete Stranger Experiment (phase ib) is the
pre-treatment measure. In the Complete Stranger Experiment, no information about
social connections or subject pairing was provided. Subjects played the Social Lending
Game with a complete stranger. The results serve as a baseline. Since the subjects are the
same for all levels of the independent variable(s), they are their own controls.
The post-treatment measurements are the Connected Stranger Experiments. They
consisted of seven treatments, which were conducted in seven different rounds of the
Social Lending Game. This can be seen as a repeated measurement (within subjects)
design. The treatments are described in section 6.3.3. Counterbalancing is a common
strategy to address carryover effects in such repeated measurement design [56-58]. We
randomized the sequence of the seven treatments. Furthermore, we arranged
pre-experiment surveys prior to each round of the game. The pre-experiment surveys
served as interferences to further prevent carryover noises. Also, pre-experiment surveys
were also designed as part of our unique endowment method (see section 6.2) so that
subjects earned a new set of capital for each round. This further removed the carryover
effects.
We arranged a period of at least seven days between the pre- and post-treatment
measures, for the following reasons:
1. Pairing up subjects for the seven treatment groups, based on relationship mining
results.
At the end of phase 1, the experimenters assisted subjects to schedule phase 2 to be
some time seven days or later than phase 1. Subjects were told that "We have a pool of
participants who also ran the same tasks, using their real Facebook identity. According to
the data, the system will find seven appropriate partners for you. You will be paired up
with them to run seven independent tasks in phase 2 at the time scheduled. Usually it
takes seven days for us to pair you up with them and schedule all seven people to the same
time. If the system can't find seven good matches for you or if some of them cannot make
it at that time, we may reschedule you to a later time." Subjects did not see the Social
Connection Graph until then. The actual pairing up method was described in section 6.5.
2. Providing interference that made it hard to recall phase i tasks.
In phase 1, the relationship-mining survey included questions regarding trust, in
the aspect of financial transactions, between friends (see section 6.3-1). The results of the
relationship-mining survey were used for construct the Social Connection Graph, which
formed the major content of the experiment treatments in the Connected Stranger
Experiment (see section 6.1.2). Thus, if the experiment treatments had been presented
right after the relationship-mining survey, the subjects might be able to infer the
experiment's purpose from the questions they just answered. To prevent this, we had
arranged interference questions at the end of the relationship-mining survey and avoided
related wordings. In addition, subjects were not allowed to perform phase 2 until seven
days after phase i.
6.1.4 Standardizing Experiment Procedure
We standardized the experiment procedure to avoid any factors that may be
induced to the experiment by experimenters. For example, Levitt and List observed in the
trust game that scrutiny by the experimenter distorted subjects' behavior [13]. Different
from the standard trust game, subjects made decisions, and delivered and received
monetary rewards through computers. We also standardized all the instructions of every
phase of the experiment, as listed in Appendix B and Appendix D. Experimenters did not
give subjects instructions or chat with subjects. Subjects were seated in a closed room, and
were not allowed to chat with the experimenter or with other participants during the
entire experiment.
6.2 Endowment
We developed an endowment method for behavior economics experiments. In
most of the behavioral economics studies, subjects are given money for free in the
beginning of the experiments. The money might not work as a effective endowment since
people may not treat the free money the same as their own money. In addition, knowing
the actual amount before the experiments may change their behavior, especially when the
experiment involves decisions about money. An alternative is to give subjects chips
without revealing the exchange rate. However, the free chips given in the beginning of the
experiments may be an even less effective endowment than free money. People may not
take them seriously and hence bias the experiment results.
In our study, subjects were not given money or chips for free. They were required
to perform tasks to earn money in chips, and use their earnings to lend, borrow, invest,
and make repayments in the Social Lending Game. They were asked to answer survey
questions. By answering each question, they earned a certain amount of chips. The
amount they earned while doing the survey questions was clearly displayed (Figure 12).
When they gathered $100 in chips, they gained the opportunity to enter one round of the
Social Lending Game (Figure 13).
Progress through the entire expenment
You'e earned $10 in chips so far.
faceook Logout I
ithn h-ni iUng P3o (MIT) is logged in.
Yang Sun (UPenn)
Do you think the profile picture of Yang Sun represents this person well?
Yes.
No.
I'm not sure
Not applicable (This person has no profile picture.)
(Your identity and your responses will be kept secret Furthermore, no data will be published on
Facebook.)
Sne]
Figure 12. The endowment procedure. Instead of endowing subjects with free
money, subjects earn capital by doing the pre-experimental survey. The amount of
money they eared is displayed on the top of the screen next to the progress bar.
Each subject, either in the role of a lender or a borrower, was endowed with the
same amount of chips this way. They were told that at the end of the study, the chips were
exchanged for real money at a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate was 8o chips to US
$1, and was not revealed until they finished all rounds of the game.
In addition, no information about the exact amount of participation payment was
clearly given beforehand. They were also told that they may use their earning to win more
from the game, or may lose their money to the other participant paired up with them in
the game. Although the money was in chips, they may take it more seriously than other
endowment methods empirically used in behavioral economics experiments.
Figure 13. The endowment screen. When subjects gathered sioo in chips
by finishing the pre-experiment survey, they gained the opportunity to
enter one round of the Social Lending Game.
6.3 Experiment Design
6-31 The Relationship-mining Survey
In phase 1, subjects were asked to answer a set of questions about their friends.
They first logged in to our experiment's system that connected with Facebook. This
allowed them to see a set of scenario questions about them and their Facebook friends.
Each friend's name and picture were displayed along with the question (Figure 14). No
data was published on Facebook. Their identity and all their responses in the
relationship-mining survey were kept secret. Their answers to these questions were
collected for relationship mining.
Good job!
You have just earned $100 in chips.
Now you are going to use the $100 in chips to play a game with one of the participants in another
room.
Please wait unti all participants are ready.
To keep all participants' identities secret, please do not leave your seat until the experimenters arrive.
Please hitthe button below. The experimenters will come and assist you to continue.
Next
Progress through the entire experiment
U
You've earned $80 in chips so far.
im RR. Ltoout <x
Co~nect and share with f'reds
Althne Sheng-Ying Pao (MIT) is logged in.
Sophia Yuditskaya (MIT)
You have an urgent need of $100. Will you ask Sophia Yuditskaya to lend you some money?
o Yes.
O No.
(Your identity and your responses will be kept secret. Furthermore, no data will be published on
Facebook.)
next
Figure 14. The relationship-mining survey, for mining trusting relationship between
friends, whose pictures and names were displayed with the scenario questions.
The purpose of phase 1, the relationship-mining survey, is to find out whether it is
a trustful relationship, a distrustful relationship, or a neutral one, between a subject and
each of their Facebook friends. However, in the representation for subjects in the
experiment, we avoided using words such as trust, trustworthiness, distrust, relationship,
friendship, rating, etc. They only saw the name "part i" instead of relationship-mining
survey (See Appendix B). This was to avoid any possible implication or framing effect.
Also, we arranged two interference questions followed by the four real questions
for relationship mining (section 4.2). The interference questions, unlike the relationship
mining questions, have nothing to do with trust or trustworthiness regarding financial
transaction. The interference questions serve as retroactive interference, and the data was
not taken into account for relationship mining. This interference makes it difficult for
subjects to recall the survey or to figure out the purpose of it. This design reduces possible
noise when subjects did the tasks in the rest of experiments regarding loan transactions
and social networks. The dummy questions were arranged as the last two questions. The
full set of questions in the relationship-mining survey is listed as follows (note: the names
were replaced by actual friend's full names of each subject's):
i. Will you lend $ioo to Thomas if he asks?
o Yes.
o No.
2. Do you believe Andrew will return the $100 borrowed from you?
o Yes.
o No.
o I'm not sure.
3. You have an urgent need of $ioo. Will you ask Sophia to lend you some
money?
o Yes.
o No.
4- Jessica is in a rush and needs your help......
Jessica gives you sioo that her friend will come pick up from you within
30 minutes. However, no one shows up. You decide not to wait for the
friend and keep the $100 in your wallet. On your way home, the sioo
gets stolen! You will ...
o say sorry to Jessica and may or may not return the entire $100.
o pay back Jessica the full amount of money by all means.
o think that sioo between you two is not a big deal. Either of you will
cover it.
5. Do you have Emily's phone number?
o Yes.
o No.
o I'm not sure.
6. Do you think the profile picture of David represents this person well?_
o Yes.
o No.
o I'm not sure.
o Not applicable (This person has no profile picture.)
The questions were presented in the sequence listed above. Our experiment
system randomly sampled forty friends of each subject. Each question was repeated forty
times, with the name and corresponding information replaced with one of the forty
friends. After finishing one question with forty friends, a subject saw the next question
with the same forty friends. The order of friends displayed with each question was in a
different random sequence. This method provides consistency within the phase 1
experiment. This allows each subject to easily go through each question regarding
multiple friends. It also allows the phase i experiment to be completed within 25 minutes
and provides sufficient data for relationship mining (Chapter 4) and for experiments phase
2 and 3.
The other purpose of phase 1, the relationship-mining survey, is to endow subjects
with capital to play the Social Lending Game in phase 2 and 3. The endowment method is
described in section 6.2. By answering each question in the relationship-mining survey,
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they got si in chips. At the end of the relationship-mining survey, they were endowed with
$200 in chips.
6.3.2 The Complete Stranger Experiment
The Complete Stranger Experiment consisted of a single round of the Social
Lending Game (see Chapter 5). In which, two subjects were randomly assigned to be the
lender and the borrower. They were seated in separate rooms, without knowing who each
other was, and were not allowed to meet each other. Subjects used the soo in chips to
play this round, right after they finished the relationship-mining survey (Figure 15).
Your money!
In this round, you will be using your $100 in chips earned from the previous ectionil
Each round of the game is independent, so the $100 can only be used in this round.
You will be playing with a different partner you have never met before. Your identities will be kept secret.
At the end of the experiment, he chips will be exchanged for real money at a fixed exchange rate.
Please click "start" to start.
start
Figure 15. The initialization of the Social Lending Game.
The two subjects paired up in this phase were complete strangers. The lender was
asked to decide how much money they would like to lend to a complete stranger to make
an investment. At the same time, the borrower had a great investment opportunity. The
borrower's own $100 was paid as the refundable participation fee for the investment,
0  0  0 mommiloommimm . ................ 
which would be reimbursed along with the investment return. The borrower made the
investment decision, using the money from a complete stranger.
You have $100
Progress through the entire experiment
Progress through the current section
You have $100
You have been iandonly pahred with an unknown participant.
We have no further Infointation about he panicipane.
Bollowe.
You and the participants de not know each other. Your identitles and responses will be kept secret. Fuetherntie. no data will be published on Facebook or ieleased to your filend.
Figure 16. The Complete Stranger Experiment, where no information about the
paired stranger was given.
No information about how the lender and the borrower were socially connected
was provided in this phase. Also, we avoided using any words regarding social networks,
social connections, or social relationships in the experiment (Figure 16). This was the first
round they played the Social Lending Game. This phase serves as the control treatment,
which provided the baseline of people's behavior in the Social Lending Game, for
comparison with the experimental treatments. See section 6.3.3 for further discussion.
6-3-3 The Connected Stranger Experiment
Different from the Complete Stranger Experiment, the Connected Stranger
Experiment provided information about how two subjects were socially connected, when
they were paired up to be the lender and the borrower. Figure 17 shows one example of the
Social Connection Graph given to subjects in the Connected Stranger Experiment. In this
example, the borrower was connected to the lender through a friend Peter. The graph also
showed that the lender was three steps away from the borrower, i.e., 3 degrees of
separation on their social networks.
You have $100
Progress through the entire experiment
Progresthrough the ourrent section
The other participant may choose to make you a loan to that you may make an Investment. According to your social network on Facebook, the fo llowing shoos your relationship to other participants.
We found that the participant is 3 steps awayfrom you, connecting through one of your friends, Peter Valeiras (Columbia).
1 Step 2 Steps 3 Steps
Participant
you
Peter Valeiras (Columbial
Priend A
You and the partilcpants do not know each other. Your Identities and responses wilt be kept secret. Furthermore, no data vll be published on Facebook or released to your friend.
The system has paired you with the above participant for this round.
Figure 17. The Social Connection Graph in the Connected Strangers Experiment.
This example shows a 3-degree separation treatment.
In addition to the graph, the subjects read:
"According to your social network on Facebook, the following shows your
relationship to other participants:
We found that the participant is 3 steps away from you, connecting through one of
your friends, Peter Valeiras (Columbia).
You and the other participant do not know each other. Your identities and
responses will be kept secret. Furthermore, no data will be published on Facebook or
released to your friend."
The Social Connection Graph and the corresponding information about the
subjects' social connections were displayed on all screens in the Connected Stranger
Experiment. Except for the Social Connection Graph, the experiment settings in various
treatments stayed the same. Two subjects who were paired up for the same round were
seated in separate rooms and were not allowed to meet each other before, during, or after
the experiment. They were strangers to each other, but were given the information of how
they were socially connected.
The Connected Stranger Experiment consisted of seven experimental treatments,
described as follows:
Positive tie treatment: The borrower and the lender were 2 degrees separated
from each other. They were socially connected through a friend. We arranged a friend
who was categorized as having a trustful relationship with the subject according to the
relationship mining results. However, no information was given to the subjects that this
friend was categorized to be a trustful friend.
The system is pairing you Mith one of the following participants. According to your social nebtoik on Facebook the following shovs your relationship to other participants.
We found that:
v You know Aaron Goldin (Harvard), and Aaron Goldin (Harrard) is a friend of Participant A.
* You and Participant 8 do not have a common friend.
* You and Participant C do not have a common friend.
Participant A Participant B Participant C
Aaron GoldrIn (Harvard)
you you you
Figure 18. The positive tie treatment screen.
The treatment screen is shown in Figure 18. The subject was told that the system
found that they and Participant A shared the common friend, Aaron. They and other
participants shared no friends. The subject was paired up with Participant A in the Social
Lending Game.
Negative tie treatment: The borrower and the lender were 2 degrees separate
from each other. They were socially connected through a friend who was categorized as
having a distrustful relationship with the subject according to the relationship mining
results. No information was given to the subjects that this friend was categorized to be a
distrustful friend. The distrustful connection treatment screen and corresponding
information was the same as the trustful connection treatment screen (Figure 18) but with
a different friend.
Unconnected stranger treatment: The borrower and the lender had no common
friend. They were socially unconnected. Different from the setting in the Complete
Stranger Experiment, where it had nothing to do with social connection (the control
treatment, see section 6-3.2), the unconnected stranger treatment here provided the
information that the subjects had been identified to share common friends with other
participants in the study. The social connection information was also provided, even
though the subject in this treatment was paired up with an unconnected one.
Throughout the unconnected stranger treatment, information as shown in Figure
19 was displayed. The subject was aware that there were three other participants in the
study. The Social Connection Graph showed that the subject was paired up with
Participant C, who shared no common friend with the subject. The same graph also
showed two other participants who were connected to the subject through their friends.
According to the relationship mining results, we arranged two trustful friends as
the two friends shown in the unconnected stranger treatment. No information was given
to the subjects that these friends were categorized to be trustful friends. It looked as if
they were coincidently put on the same screen, for showing that the system found
common friends between them and the other participants.
Thy systtrri iv puiring Vuu wit u u 1hm fuwing pUtiucipur I. Accuordirig tu vuur vudlv riutwurk uri Fcubuok, the fMulwinig uhuwv yuur ruitiunship tu utwnr purtiparlt
le found that:
You know Aaron Oc Idin (Harvard) , and Aarcn Goldh Oiarvard) Is aMend of Particl2ant A.
* Vou know Peter Valeiras (Columbia) , and Peter Valeiras (Columbia) is a Mend of Participant B.
e Ycu and Participant C do not haw a conmnon Mend.
You have been paired with Participant C
PwtI* A Parolecipa a Paruckant C
Peter Valeras(
Aaron Gon lwanad)
Iou you fou
Figure 19. The unconnected stranger treatment.
3-degree separation treatment: The social distance between the borrower and
the lender was 3 degrees of separation. They were socially connected through a friend. We
arranged a friend who was categorized as having a trustful relationship with the subject
according to our relationship mining results. However, no information was given for the
subjects that this friend was categorized to be a trustful friend. The treatment screen is
shown in Figure 17.
4-degree separation treatment: Same setting as in the 3-degree separation
treatment, except for the borrower and the lender were 4 steps away.
5-degree separation treatment: Same setting as in the 3-degree separation
treatment, except for the borrower and the lender were 5 steps away.
6-degree separation treatment: Same setting as in the 3-degree separation
treatment, except for the borrower and the lender were 6 steps away.
ey 6 N
In order to compare the Connected Strangers Experiment results with the
Complete Strangers Experiment results (the baseline), subjects were required to play the
same role in phase 2 and phase 3 experiments (see Appendix D).
6.3.4 The review questionnaire
The purpose of the review questionnaire is the following:
1. To find out the decision making strategy.
2. To investigate their experiences interacting with the game interface.
3. To collect information in order to rule out data that may be noisy or biased.
The review questionnaire was only carried out after the experiments were
completed, but before the participation payment was made. The questions for subjects
participated as a lender are slightly different from those for a borrower. The review
questionnaire is listed in Appendix E.
6.4 Subject Recruitment
Subjects who were qualified for the experiment had to meet the following criteria:
(i) they must be age 18 or older; (2) they must have an active Facebook with their real
identity; (3) they must have logged in Facebook within the past 6 months using the real
identity; (4) they have at least 50 Facebook friends (see Appendix A and G)
Subjects were recruited from a variety of sources. The major source was the Sona
System, a web-based human subject pool management, hosted by MIT Behavior Research
Lab2 . Other electronic advertisements were posted on Facebook and Craigslist Boston3 .
Physical advertisements were posted on public bulletin boards, around Cambridge and
Boston (see Appendix G for subjects recruiting advertisement). The experiment ran with
human subjects was under COUHES approval (see Appendix F).
2 The SONA systems in MIT Behavior Research Lab, http://mitbrl.sona-systems.com/
3 Craigslist Boston, http://boston.craigslist.org/
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6-5 Subjects Pairing
Subjects were not allowed to invite friends to sign up in the same session or to
participate in the same round. This was to prevent any bias caused by prior knowledge of
the other party, such as appearance, gender, or acquaintance from past interactions.
Subjects could only know about the other party from information given in the experiment.
In the Complete Stranger Experiment (experiment phase i), subjects were
randomly paired up to play the role of the borrower and the lender. A borrower and a
lender might have met each other before the experiment, or might have invited each other
to participate together without telling the experimenters. To further prevent the
pre-experiment acquaintance bias, we scheduled multiple subjects for the same session
and seated them in separate rooms with doors closed. They were paired up with a
randomly chosen other. Subjects were told that they were paired up with a stranger, but
no information about the stranger was given. The information and identity about who was
paired up with whom was never revealed.
The same settings were applied to the Connected Stranger Experiment
(experiment phase 2) except for subjects pairing. Subjects played seven rounds of the
Social Lending Game. Each round was an experimental treatment, where they were told
that they were paired up with a different partner who was socially connected to them in a
different way (see 6.3.3). In fact, they were all randomly paired up with seven other
participants, regardless of the actual social connection. The only pairing criterion was the
borrower/lender roles had to be consistent with those in the Complete Stranger
Experiment run seven days earlier, i.e., a lender was paired up with the seven random
subjects who had played as borrowers in phase 1 and vice versa. They were seated in
separate rooms with doors closed for the whole time. The Social Connection Graph (such
as in Figure 17) provided subjects with the information of the paired partner, which was
the only information given about the pairing relationship. No real identity or real social
connection information was revealed.
At the end of phase i, each subject was told that the system would take some time
to arrange a group of seven people to pair up with him/her for the phase 2 experiment.
They were also told that "the system will look for seven people who passed certain criteria
to be your partners in the phase 2 study." Forty-eight hours before the time a subject
were scheduled for phase 2, a message was sent to the subject, as shown in Figure 20:
0 StudyA MIT Media Lab show details 3:36 PM (0 minutes ago) + ) Reply v
You are scheduled to participate in the study 'Earn Money by Playing Facebook Games Part
2' on Wednesday, November 25, 2009 2:50 PM - 3:25 PM at Behavioral Research Lab - E19
Suite 435.
For Part 2, the system has paired you up with the following 7 people to play in 7 different
rounds:
-**ve** B*t*
**a**** *g*n**
-*m*** L*n*
-***x* *my****
-p**n** **V*
-N**c*** ****y
-*v**e D**f*
To keep your identities secret, you will be seated in different rooms but will start
corresponding rounds at the same time. Please arrive on time.
For questions, please contact studya20095.gmail.com
Thank you!
*) Repy "+ Forward
Figure 20. The pairing-up message before the Connected Stranger Experiment.
We sent this message to make subjects think the system had paired them up with
seven people based on certain criteria. This made subjects believe that they played with
seven other people in real time during the Connected Stranger Experiment. Also, this may
strengthen the authenticity of the Social Connection Graph and corresponding
information given in the Connected Stranger Experiment (see Figure 17 and section 6.3.3).
In fact, the names in the message were not real names of the paired participants. Our
system randomly paired up borrowers with lenders. In practical implementation of the
.... .......................... ................
experiment, our system allows subjects in a pair to show up at different time. The design
and implementation of the experiment system is described in Chapter 7.
6.6 Social Identity and Confidentiality
Subjects were first given a five-digit unique number as the experiment ID. With
the ID, they logged in to our experiment system. We incorporated actual social network
data from Facebook to our experiment system (see Chapter 7). Through our experiment's
interface, they logged in to Facebook with their real Facebook identity, with which, the
actual social network data can be captured and displayed in the experiment. No data was
published on Facebook. The responses from each subject were only corresponded with the
experiment ID, where no real identity was recorded with the experiment data. For further
details see Appendix F.
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Chapter 7
System Design
7.1 System Overview
The experiment system is implemented as a web-based platform with an
interactive interface 4, which allows more than one subject to participate. The experiment
system includes a main server that handles the experiment platform and receives each
subject's decisions, pairs up subjects from different rooms in real time, and handles
corresponding responses to subjects. Virtual money is used in the game. The system keeps
track of each subject's capital in different rounds of the game. In addition, the experiment
system integrates actual social networks, which allows us to carry out relationship mining
and to examine trust in the social context.
7.2 Integrating Actual Social Networks
We chose Facebook for this experiment because it has been the largest social
network dataset with the largest number of users to date. Also, Facebook users use their
4 Our experiment system was located at http://486a.media.mit.edu/cgi-bin/ML/start.pl
real identities. This allows us to conduct our experiment by leveraging actual social
networks. We developed a stand-alone experiment server, which uses Facebook Connect'
to have our server communicate with Facebook in real time.
Subjects log in to the experiment server with a subject ID, which is to keep their
identity secret during the experiment. At the same time, they log in to Facebook with their
real identity (Figure 21). Once subjects log in, our experiment server gathers data from
Facebook and displays information about their friends as part of the experiment contents.
Each subject's friends, including their names, pictures, networks, etc can be directly
viewed with the experiment questions or within the Social Connection Graph. The
hyperlinks to their friends' pages are provided, so the subjects can review their friends
during the experiment. This realizes the relationship mining using actual social networks
in real time, and allows the Social Connection Graph to be displayed with the subjects'
actual first degree friends.
s The Facebook Connect http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/1o8;
http://developers.facebook.com/
Welcome
Progress through the entire ge
insedt ID here
Pass*Wd
O Lender
OSornoW
nex
Welcome
Progress through the Experiment
Now you are gpoinj to answet a seties of questions involvingq youm andli your Facebook
fiiends. Please answev each qutestion honestly.
'Facebook data Is loaded into this Intetface. Eveythinj fioen tils site will not be published
on Facebook. Fsthernsooe, youm identity and all yout actiois in this gamlle will be kept
secret.
Please loginm witth tie buttonl below to log i.
* #,jbookcomdlaptLphpW.t.2u..oa-l&.,chin-1&fbcouueM ~
Conaect Experiment with Facebook to nteract Wth your friends on this ste and
to share on Facebook through your Wi and frilndm News Feeds,
erig your fiends and ino
Puish content to yur Wi fl
Email:
Password:
Sign up for Facebook
althpaqomeda,mnt.adu
fcwic~
Figure 21. After subjects log in to the experiment server with a subject ID (a), the
experiment system connects with Facebook using their real social identity (b).
[f Connec Facebook I
X
7.3 Interface Design for Behavioral Study
All that subjects knew about each other in the experiment was the social
connection information. Because this was the only information we provided, one concern
was it may force subjects to use this information. This is a common consideration with
similar games. The way we prevented this is by the following:
First, no terms relevant to social connections or social preferences appear in the
description of the game interface or on the Social Connection Graph; nor do they appear
on the consent form (Appendix F) or the subject recruitment Ads (Appendix E). Also, in
the game interface, the information about the subjects' social connections is presented in
such a way to let them know that "your identities are kept secret", and to let them know
that "we have paired you up with a subject." In the interface of the experiment, subjects
perceive it as playing a Facebook game, where they can fluidly review friends' Facebook
pictures and links while they were making their decisions.
The interface is also designed in the way that the Social Connection Graph is
embedded in the decision screens. No special emphasis is put on the Social Connection
Graph. No sound or no graphical effects are built with the interface. We picked the same
background color and simple layout to prevent potential bias from the experiment
environment.
In addition, the experiment's interface can be simply run on any browser. We
incorporated several features in the experiment's interface design to ensure the quality of
the data. These features include a decision preview window, go-back prevention, and a
progress bar for endowment. The decision preview window is a pop-up window for
subjects to reconfirm their decisions before they are finally made. Considering the
experiment involves monetary calculations, we provide the preview window to make sure
the data collected represent their actual decisions. The go-back prevention then prevents
subjects from visiting previous choices and modifying them. The progress bar not only
displays the progress throughout the experiment but also indicates the amount of virtual
money they accumulate in the Social Lending Game. This keeps reminding the subjects
how much money they own, which serves as a unique endowment methods (see section
6.2).
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Chapter 8
Results
There were 372 people from around the greater Boston area signed up to the study,
of which, there were 158 participated. 135 people completed all phases of the study, of
which, 45 played the role as a lender and 90 as a borrower. The data collected from each
subject was normalized based on the maximum amount and minimum amount of money
they sent. We analyzed the lending decision, the investment decision, and the repayment
decision of the subject. The results and discussions regarding trust, risk preferences and
reciprocity in terms of the influence of social perceptions are described as followed.
8.i Influence of Social Perceptions on Trust
Trust was measured by the amount of money sent by the lender to the borrower in
the Social Lending Game. The lender was aware that the borrower used the loan to invest.
The borrower may have shared the investment profit with the lender, if they decided to. If
the borrower lost the investment, they still had the ability to pay back the loan, although
they can choose not to do so. The lender's decision was based on the anticipation of
whether the borrower would decide to pay back the loan or to share the profit. The
amount lent indicated how much the lender trusted the borrower.
The lender's anticipation relied only on the social perceptions of the paired
borrower. Although they were strangers, they perceived how they were socially connected
through the Social Connection Graph and corresponding information. Seven types of
social perceptions were formed by the seven experimental treatments: "positive tie
treatment", "negative tie treatment", "unconnected stranger treatment", "3-degree
separation treatment", "4-degree separation treatment", "5-degree separation treatment",
and "6-degree separation treatment" (see section 6-3.3). The question asked was: will trust
be influenced by the perceived social connections between the two parties?
We analyzed the loan amount in each of the seven treatments to examine how
social perceptions influence trust. Section 8.1.1 compares the results from "positive tie
treatment" and "negative tie treatment." Comparing with the baseline, it shows the
difference between the impacts of negative social perceptions and positive social
perceptions on trust. Section 8.1.2 compares the results with those from "unconnected
stranger treatment." Our results provide a different view from previous studies, which
concluded that people trust strangers [3, 22]. The experiments results led to a possible
model of trust between strangers. Section 8.1.3 describes whether the strength of social
perceptions influences trust.
8.1.1 Negative Social Perceptions Undermined Trust
We compared the results from "positive tie treatment" and "negative tie treatment"
from the Connected Stranger Experiment. The level of trust under the negative tie
treatment was 35% lower than that under the positive tie treatment (Figure 22). A paired
t-test showed that significantly lower trust was observed in the negative tie treatment than
the positive tie treatment (p=o.o4). Note that in the negative tie treatment, the lender was
aware that they and the borrower were connected through a mutual friend, whom the
lender did not trust. However, whether the connection was a trustful or distrustful
relationship between the borrower and the mutual friend was unknown to the lender. This
result shows the following: A negative social perception was formed and projected onto a
stranger only if the stranger knew a person whom the subject did not trust. Such negative
8o
perceptions significantly diminished trust in that stranger. In other words, people can be
distrusted simply by being perceived to know a distrustful person.
This observation suggested the following hypotheses: a positive social perception
should also be formed and projected onto a stranger if the stranger was a trustful friend's
friend. Furthermore, such positive perceptions should induce trust. However, although
slightly more trust was observed than the baseline behavior, the difference was
insignificant (Figure 22, p=o.8 7). People did not trust more when there was a positive
connection existing between strangers. In other words, a negative connection undermined
cooperative behavior between strangers, but a positive connection did not help.
Figure 22. Comparison of positive tie treatment and
negative tie treatment.
Our results show that having positive social connections did not significantly
increase trust when comparing with the control group. The control group was consistent
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with the setting in the standard trust game, where complete strangers were paired up and
no social connection-related information was given. With the results of the standard trust
game, previous studies concluded that people trust strangers, but, at the same time, they
raised the question why people do so [3, 22]. Does it mean that people trust strangers as
much as friends' friends? The following analysis addressed this question.
8.1.2 Model of Trust between Strangers
Literature concluded that people trust strangers [3, 22]. Our results suggest a
different view. We compared the results of the complete stranger experiment (control),
with that of the unconnected stranger treatment. Recall the settings for the control and
unconnected stranger treatment (section 6.3.2 and 6.3-3). In the control setting, the lender
and the borrower were complete strangers. Throughout the entire experiment, there was
no information or implication about social connections. The control setting was
consistent with empirical studies using the standard trust game [3, 22]. In the
unconnected stranger treatment, the lender was given the Social Connection Graph
showing their relationships to three other strangers, who participated as the borrower and
were seated in separate rooms (Figure 19). The lender was paired up with one of them
whom they shared no mutual friends with, while the lender was aware that the other two
participants knew the lender's friends in real life. In both the "unconnected stranger" and
the control settings, the borrowers were both strangers who shared no common friends
with the lender. If people trusted strangers, as previous studies concluded, same level of
trust should have been observed in both settings.
However, as shown in Figure 23, we observed significantly lower levels of trust in
the unconnected stranger treatment than in the complete stranger experiment (p = 0.01).
We concluded that people do not trust strangers. If this is true, why do people trust
strangers in empirical studies and in our complete stranger setting?
We compared the results with connected strangers, i.e., friends' friends. Trust
observed between "unconnected strangers" was 51% lower than the strangers who had a
trustful common friend (i.e., positive tie treatment). The results are shown in Figure 23.
The unconnected stranger treatment and the positive tie treatment differed significantly
(p=o.ooi) according to a paired t-test between. As for the complete strangers, no
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significant difference in trust was observed from the positive tie treatment (p=o.8 7). The
results show that people trust complete strangers as much as friends' friends, but they
distrust unconnected strangers.
We also compared the results with the negative tie treatment (i.e., the strangers
who had a distrustful common friend). Although trust was 27% weaker in unconnected
strangers than in negative tie treatment, the difference was not significant (p=o.21).
However, people trust complete strangers 30% more than negative tied strangers (p=o.io),
and 48% more than the unconnected strangers (p = o.oi). The results show that people
distrust unconnected strangers as much as a betrayer's friends. No connection does not
mean neutral.
Our findings suggested that people considered complete strangers to be connected
strangers. In the Complete Stranger Experiment, as well as in empirical studies, the
possibility that the subjects have common friends with the paired anonymous counterpart
was not excluded. These experiments settings simply ignore the fact that humans are
social animals and strangers are potentially connected. When there was no further
information about their social relationships, people supposed they were potentially
connected and showed trust as if they were trustfully tied, even though they were
complete strangers.
On the contrary, the "unconnected stranger" treatment excluded such possibility.
In the unconnected stranger treatment, we modeled the real world situations where
multiple strangers existed, among whom, some were friends' friends while others were
strangers with no mutual friends. Under this condition, the behavior which measured
truthfully represented trust between strangers. Our results show that trust was
significantly weaker between unconnected strangers than the baseline behavior. People
did not really trust strangers, especially when they were told that they were unconnected
to the strangers.
Figure 23. Comparing trust between unconnected strangers, connected
strangers (positive tie and negative tie) and complete strangers (control).
Based on the results, we addressed the question that was raised earlier: Do people
trust friend's friends as much as strangers? Is a positive social connection useless when it
comes to trust? Our data showed that having a positive social tie motivated significantly
stronger trust than no social tie. However, people presumed they were potentially
connected to a stranger. If no information was provided, people regarded a stranger as a
friend's friend and hence signal trust to the stranger.
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Our experiments results represent a possible model of trust between strangers in
real world: people presupposed they were connected and place trust, unless they perceived
that they were unconnected. When there existed connected strangers, people distrusted
complete strangers and trusted connected ones instead. In other words, people trusted
strangers unless they were provided with better options - the connected strangers.
The results reflect the problems in empirical experiment design. In empirical
studies, subjects encounter only one anonymous counterpart. They perceive that there
were no other options. In the real world, people are surrounded by strangers but are aware
of the possibility that a stranger may be a friend's friend. Thus, even though subjects were
told that their paired partner in the experiment was a stranger, they behaved as if that was
a connected stranger. Consequently, trust between strangers in these experiments is
shown to be higher than expected. Such experiments settings ignored the social aspects of
human behavior and may not truthfully measure trust in strangers. Instead, it represented
the baseline behavior that people are trusting with insufficient information.
8.1-3 Trust along Social Distance
We further asked how trust-based decisions vary with different strengths of social
perceptions. The strength of social perceptions was a function of social distance. Social
distance is usually measured in degrees of separation. A direct friend is considered as one
degree of separation. A friend's friend is two degrees away, and so on. As the simplest
linear model, we considered trust decreased when social distance increased.
We compared the results from 2 degrees to 6 degrees of separation. Figure 24
shows the change of trust versus social distance. The results reject the hypothesis that
trust decreased linearly with social distance. Instead, the results suggest that there was a
social threshold of trust at 2 degrees of separation. When strangers were connected within
2 degrees, i.e., when the strangers were friends' friends, the level of trust was 2.19 times
higher than unconnected stranger. However, when the social distance was 3 degrees, the
level of trust dropped 53%. Beyond, 2 degrees of separation, although the strength of trust
was slightly higher than trust between unconnected strangers, the difference was not
significant.
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Figure 24. Trust versus social distance.
Comparing with the control (complete strangers), this finding supported the above
model of trust between strangers (section 8.1.2) and further inferred that people presumed
complete strangers to be potentially connected in 2 degrees of separation. In other words,
people regarded complete strangers the same as friends' friends and trusted them.
However, when provided with information showing that the strangers were beyond 2
degrees separation, people considered them as unconnected and distrusted them.
8.2 Influence of Social Perception on Risk
Preference
Risk preferences were measured by the investment decisions the borrowers made
(See Chapter 5 and Figure 3). The Connected Stranger Experiments allowed us to
investigate whether social perceptions influence risk preference using others' money.
Recall that the borrowers were given two investment options. Option one was a high
risk-high return investment and option two was a low risk-low return option. The risk
preference measurement was based on the investment options in a range between i and 2.
Table 1 shows risk preference across different treatments. The baseline risk
preference was 1.41, where i indexed extremely risk-seeking and 2 meant extremely safe. It
was measured in the Complete Stranger Experiment (control), where no further
information about social connections between the borrower and lender pair was provided.
control unconnected positive negative degree=3 degree=4 degree=5 degree=6
stranger tie tie
Risk
1.41 1-35 1.24 1-3 1-33 1-3 1-3 1.27
Preference
p value 0-552 0.048 0.208 0-374 0.208 
0.144 0.101
Table i. Risk preference across different treatments (1: extremely risk-seeking, 2:
extremely safe). The p values listed are paired t-tests between each treatment and
the baseline measured in the complete stranger experiment (control).
The risk preference index under the positive tie treatment was 1.24. When
comparing with the baseline (risk preference index = 1.35), the results show that people
made riskier decisions when using the money from a stranger with a positive tie (i.e., the
stranger was perceived to be a trustful friend's friend). A paired t-test between the positive
tied treatment and the baseline showed significant difference (p= 0.048). When using
money from a negatively tied stranger, an unconnected stranger, as well as from strangers
whose connections were beyond 2 degrees of separation, people tended to make only
slightly riskier decisions but the change was insignificant.
We looked for other possible factors that dominated the investment decisions. We
analyzed 18o data points across different experiment days during the entire experiment
period, from November 2009 to March 2010. We found that weather had a strong impact
on investment decisions (Table 2). People made significantly riskier decisions on sunny
days than on raining days.
sunny days raining days
Risk Preference 1.28 1.44
p value 0.027
Table 2 Risk preference and weather.
In order to exclude the weather factor, we looked further at the investment
decisions on the same day to examine the influence of social perception on risk preference.
Table 3 shows the results on a sunny day. A within-subject comparison between the
unconnected stranger treatment and other treatments was made. Interestingly, much
riskier decisions were made when in the positive tie treatment. The risk preference factor
in the positive tie treatment (1.13) was significantly lower than that (1-38) in the
unconnected stranger treatment (p=0.05). The results in other treatments show no
significant difference. This finding was consistent with the previous results, which suggest
that people made riskier decision if and only if the encountered counterpart was a trustful
friend's friend.
unconnected positive negative
degree=3 degree=4 degree=5 degree=6
stranger tie tie
Risk 1.38 1.13 1.25 1.31 1.25 1.38 1.25
Preference
p value 0.05 0.46 0.72 0.46 1.00 0.46
Table 3. Comparing risk preference across different social perception
treatments on a sunny day.
8.3 Influence of Social Perceptions on Reciprocity
Reciprocity was measured from the payback decisions in the situation where the
borrowers lost the lender's money and had to use their own money for the repayment. In
the Social Lending Game, the borrowers use all the money from the lender to make an
investment. The borrower's own money was paid for a participation fee and was refunded
at the end of the investment. If the borrower lost the investment, all the money from the
lender was gone (see Chapter 5 and Figure 3). In this situation, the amount paid back
indicated reciprocity. We investigated whether social perceptions influenced reciprocating
behavior.
We compared the defect rate across different experiment treatments in the
situation when the borrower lost the investment. The defect rate was calculated by the
percentage of people who paid back so. The results show that negatively connected
strangers defected twice as much as the baseline, while the defect rate between positively
connected strangers was similar to baseline (Figure 25). Unconnected strangers defected
54% more than the baseline. As for strangers who were connected in more than two
degrees of separation, no significant difference in defect rate was observed.
Figure 25. Defect rate across experiment treatments in the condition when
losing the investment.
When the borrowers won the investment, we focused on whether they shared the
profit with the lender, by which we investigated whether social perception had an impact
on reciprocity. We compared the unconnected stranger treatment and the positive tie
treatment. We plotted the unconnected stranger lender-borrower pairs as green dots and
the positive tied stranger pairs as red triangles (Figure 26). The red line and green line
correspondingly represent the linear trends of these two treatments. The black solid line
indicates repaying exactly the loan amount. The black dashed line indicates the amount
where the borrower split the investment profit evenly with the lender, in addition to
returning the full amount of loan. Data points closer towards the up-left corner indicate
more reciprocal, while those data points under the ioo% repayment line represent
non-reciprocal.
Figure 26. The distribution of repayment vs. loan.
The results show that 87% of the borrowers paid back the full amount of loan in
the positive tied treatment. Among them, 39% shared the investment profit with the
anonymously paired lender. In the unconnected stranger treatment, the defect rate was
higher. There were 45% of the borrowers did not pay back the full amount. Among them,
50% completely defected. The sharing behaviors were observed in the other experiment
treatments and there was no significant difference.
Previous studies using the standard trust game show that people reciprocate and
split the earnings evenly [3, 22]. However, in our experiment, no one split their profit with
the paired stranger. The borrowers shared 21% of the investment profit on average. The
maximum portion shared was 33%. This result suggests that the empirical experiment
design may have the "free money effect" that motivated the subjects to be fair, while the
real reciprocating behavior may be biased.
........................   ............... ....................
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
We identified an experimental procedure where trust can be measured in social
contexts. This study presented the relationship mining methods that categorize social
connections into trustful tie, distrustful tie, and neutral tie. We manipulated the types and
strengths of social connections to form perceptions of strangers in a monetary exchange.
Using the Social Lending Game, we incorporated real-world social relationships to
investigate whether social perception influenced trust, risk preference and reciprocity. The
game design, along with the results, reflects problems in empirical experiments around
trust measurement. The results also led to a possible model of trust between strangers in
real world.
In summary, the experiment's results draw the following conclusions. First, people
trust strangers as much as if they were friends' friends. In contrast, people distrust
strangers when they are told the strangers have no friends in common with them, or when
the presence of connected strangers is perceived. The results may infer the following:
people presuppose strangers as connected within two degrees of separation and trust
them. Hence, knowing that someone is a friend's friend does not actively increase trust.
Although having a positive connection does not motivate trust, it serves as a
prevention mechanism from being distrusted. Further results indicate that no connection
does not mean neutral. When provided with information showing that a stranger was not
any friend's friend (an unconnected stranger), people distrust the stranger as much a
betrayer's friend. Given this, no information about a stranger makes people trust more
than having some reference to signify a stranger is a stranger; although they are both
strangers and a rational person should trust them equally.
Negative social perception strongly undermines cooperative behavior. In other
words, people can be distrusted simply by being perceived to know a distrustful person.
Note that the stranger could be a close friend to the distrustful person, or could also have
a negative relationship with that distrustful person. Such information may further change
the perception and influence trust. Trust is a guiding behavioral instinct, while social
perceptions are a major factor that altered trust. This research provides evidence that trust
in strangers can be manipulated. Implications for future applications include leveraging
social perception to influence trust-based decisions.
The same influence of social perception on trusting behavior was found to be on
reciprocating behavior. People reciprocate with complete strangers as if they were a
friend's friend. Between unconnected strangers, or strangers beyond two degrees of
separations, people tend to focus on self interest and choose to betray. This further
supports the possible model of trust-based decisions between strangers: people
presuppose that strangers are connected through a trustful friend and place reciprocity,
even though a rational person should consider all strangers as unconnected and
reciprocate the same.
The reciprocity measurement in our experiment's design reflects potential factors
that may bias the reciprocating behavior in empirical studies [3, 22]. We identified the
"free money effect" with experimental evidence. The results also address similar concerns
in literature [51. The experiment's design in this study may provide a more accurate way to
examine trust and reciprocity.
Furthermore, the Social Lending Game allows us to investigate risk preference.
The results reveal that people use money from strangers differently depending on the
social connections. With positive connected strangers (friend's friend), people tend to
make riskier decisions. At the same time, if they lose money from the stranger, higher
level of reciprocity exist between positive connected strangers. Unlike the model of trust
and reciprocity between strangers, people do not regard complete strangers the same as
positively connected ones and risk their money. Risky choices are more likely to be made
with positive connected strangers. This opens new directions for future research
determining how risk preferences and trust may intertwine, with respect of social aspects.
Our results also suggest that weather could be a predictor of risk preferences.
Sunshine arouses risk-taking propensity. On rainy days, people are more risk-averse. This
result is inconsistent with a previous study which implies that good weather is associated
with investors being less willing to tolerate risk [591- They correlated good mood with
good weather conditions and indicated that "The better is [sic.] the investors' mood, the
more risk averse they are." Various previous studies have documented relations between
weather conditions and real-life investment returns [60-631. To date, however, there has
not been a complementary analysis between weather and risk preferences. Our findings,
in conjunction with the methods in this study, suggest that it may be valuable to explore
how weather or other social proxies affect trust and risk-taking.
A rational person should act the same way with different strangers, and the
decisions made should make no difference between one stranger versus another. In this
research, we demonstrated that the perception of a stranger can be manipulated by little
information about social connections. A decision maker's gauge relies on the social
perceptions of the other party and the social perceptions altered trust, risk-preference,
and reciprocity. We concluded that people maximize their utility from both material
consumption and social anticipation. An agent who is considered irrational by empirical
economics or game-theoretic views may actually be socially rational.
The methods in this study shed light on further research investigating social
perceptions and trust-based behaviors. Measurement of trust, as well as reciprocity,
should be considered under social contexts. The results from this study can be applied to
everyday exchanges ranging from entry-stage interactions to decisions in the virtual world.
The findings may serve as basis of future research on leveraging social networks to
reinvestigate utility theory, trust-based decisions and risk-taking behaviors.
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Before you start....
* Is your age above 18?
" Do you have an active Facebook account with your real identity?
* Do you have more than 50 Facebook friends?
* Have you logged in Facebook within the past 6 months using your real
identity?
If you answer "No" to any of the above questions, please tell the researchers!
If your answers to all of the above questions are yes, please read the following
documents.
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The documents include an instruction and a consent form. Please read them
carefully and sign on the last page of the consent form.
If you have any questions before you sign, please feel free to ask the researchers.
After you sign the consent form, please do NOT leave your seat in order to keep
yours and other participants' identities secret.
Please do NOT use the computer before the researchers enter the room.
When all participants are ready to start, the researchers will come to your room,
collect the form and assist you to log in.
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Instruction for Experiments Phase i
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Facebook Study Instruction for Part i:
The Facebook study has two parts. Today you are doing Part 1. After 7 days or
longer, you will come back and play Part 2.
You will be paired up with different people who are strangers to you to participate
in each round. You and your partners in each round are seated in separate rooms. The
door will be closed during the entire study. To keep everyone's identity and responses
secret, please do NOT leave your room without further instructions given by the
researchers.
Your payment of participating in the study will be made after you finish part 2. The
total amount of payment is decided by your decisions and your partners' decisions.
In today's part, you will first see a set of questions involving you and your
Facebook friends. NO data will be published on Facebook. Your answers to these
questions will only be used to help the researchers to pair you up with good matches for
you to play in Part 2. Your identity and all your responses will be kept secret. Your
Facebook friends have no way to know anything about this study unless you tell them.
When you answer the questions, you will earn money in chips, which will be your
money to play the game with your partners. The chips will be exchanged to real money
at the end of part z. You may win more money from your partner. It is also possible that
you may lose your money to your partner.
IMPORTANT: If you do not see the pictures of your Facebook friends while
completing Part i, please lightly knock on the door and we will come to assist you.
Today we have paired you up with one partner. You will use the money to play in
one round. After you read the instruction and sign the consent form, the experimenter
will come and assist you to start.
Good luck!
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Demographics Survey
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i.Are you Male or Female?
. ~Male
. rFemale
2.What is your age? (please enter your age)
3.What is your own yearly income?
Less than $20,000
e $20,000 - $34,999
* $35,000 - $ 49,999
e $50,000 - $ 74,999
e $75,000 - $99,999
. $1oo,ooo or more
Appendix D
Instruction for Experiments Phase 2
Facebook Study Instruction for Part 2:
Before you start, please turn off your cell phone.
The Facebook study has two parts. Today you are doing Part 2.
According to your answers to the questions in Part 1, the system has matched you
with other participants who also completed Part 1. The system has paired you up with 7
participants for today's study. You will be playing with each of them in 7 different
rounds.
You and your partners in each round are seated in separate rooms. The door will
be closed during the entire study. To keep everyone's identity and responses secret, please
do NOT leave your room or do NOT open the door without further instructions given by
the researchers.
Last time at the end of Part 1, you still have $100 in chips left. This soo will be used
in the first round. After that, you will have a chance to get another $1oo in chips for the 2 nd
round and so on. In other words, you will have a new set of soo in chips before a new
round starts.
Your payment of participating in the study will be made after you finish Part 2.
The total amount of payment is decided by your decisions and your partners' decisions.
The exchange rate is fixed will be revealed at the end. The payment will be made in cash
or cash voucher.
Please note that each round is independent. Your payment in each round is only
decided by the actions of you and your partner in that round. The money you gain or lose
in one round is completely not related to the previous or next round. Even if you win a lot
in one round, you are not allowed to use it in the next round. Similarly, if you lose money
in one round, you are not able to make it up in the next round. You will be doing the task
with a new partner and in a new setting in the new round.
NO data will be published on Facebook. Your identity and all your responses will
be kept secret. Your Facebook friends have no way to know anything about this study.
IMPORTANT: If you do not see the pictures of your Facebook friends while
completing Part 1, please lightly knock on the door and we will come to assist you.
In each round, the screen will display a graph indicating who your partner
is. If you do not understand any part of the instructions, or if you are not sure
about who you are paired up with, please knock on the door and let us know
before you continue to the next step!
There may be a short period of waiting time between each round. It is for the
system to connect you to your partner in the next round, and to wait until everyone is
ready. Please be patient and do not leave the room.
You may win more money from your partner. It is also possible that you may lose
your money to your partner.
Good luck!
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Review Questionnaire
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Follow-up
* Required
What's your SONA ID? *
Are you familiar with the trust game? *
( I'm an expert of the trust game, related economics games, and game theory
C< I understand how the trust game works but not the game theory or economics assumptions.
O I heard about it but not too familiar.
C9 I have never heard about it.
Do you understand the graphs showing how you are connected to the other participants
through your friends? *
( no
O yes
(if no) what may cause the confusion?
(What do you not understand about the graphs?)
Do you think the instruction of the game is easy to usnderstand? *
( Yes, its clear.
O No, it is confusing at some point.
(if no) What do you think is confusing?
Were you aware that you might lose your money because borrowers might not return it? *
. ..... .......................
o Yes, I thought about this but not from the instructions
o Yes, I found this from the instructions
0 No, I was not aware of this because the instruction is not clear.
What made you decide the amount of money that you sent to other participants in each
round? *
you can choose more than one answer if any of the following fits.
No particular reason. I decided the amount of money quite randomly.
I decided the amount based on who were the friends that could link me to the borrowers.
I decided based on how many steps the borrowers could be connected to me.
I tried to predict whether the borrowers would return me money. Based on that I decided how
much to lend.
D Other:
When you made your decisions, did you take into acount that the borrowers might not return
you the full amount you lent? *
0 yes
0 only in a certain rounds
O no
In regards to the last question, when did you think the borrowers might not return the full
amount? *
(If you answered no to the last question, please go to the next question)
F I took this into account when I played after a few rounds. I didn't realize this in the first few
rounds.
F I took this into account only in the first few rounds. I didn't feel safe in the beginning but I worried
about this less after played it for a while.
F I took this into account when the borrowers are connected to me through a friend I don't like
7 I took this into account when the borrowers are too many steps away from me.
[i Other:
Why did you still send money to the borrowers if you thought that they might not return it?
(if you sent $0 to all the other participants, please go to the next question.)
Why did you decide not to send money to the borrowers?
(if you did not send $0 to the other participants, please go to the next question.)
During the game (not after the game), do you believe you played with different participants? *
Yes, I believe I was playing with a different person in each round.
No, I think I was playing with the same person.
No, I believe I was playing with a computer, not a real person.
Submit
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* Required
What's your SONA ID? *
Are you familiar with the trust game? *
O I'm an expert of the trust game, related economics games, and game theory
o I understand how the trust game works but not the game theory or economics assumptions.
0 I heard about it but not too familiar.
o I have never heard about it.
Do you understand the graphs showing how you are connected to the other participants
through your friends? *
O no
o yes
(if no) what may cause the confusion?
(What do you not understand about the graphs?)
Do you think the instructions for the game are easy to understand? *
C Yes, it's clear.
o No, it is confusing at some point.
(If no) What do you think is confusing?
In each round when you were asked to make an investment decision between a risky option
and a safe option, how did you decide? *
No particular reason. I randomly picked one of them.
Based on whom I was playing with.
Other:
(If you choose "Based on whom I was playing with." ) Which of the following is close to your
strategy?
F I tend to choose the safer investment option if I am playing with someone who is my good friend's
friend.
F I tend to choose the risky investment option if I am playing with someone who is my good friend's
friend.
F1 I tend to choose the safer investment option if I am playing with someone who is more steps
away from me.
F I tend to choose the risky investment option if I am playing with someone who is more steps away
from me.
F Other:
When you won in the investments, did you share any portion of the investment profits with the
other participants? *
( Yes, I have.
No, I have not.
Why did you decide to share (or not to share) the investment profits with the other
participants? *
When you lost in the investments, did you still return the money to the other participants? *
Yes, I did
K No, I did not.
I did in some rounds but not always.
Why did you decide to pay back (or not to pay back) when you lost in the investment? *
"I'l l, ......... .  . ... .. ........... .. .. ..... .............................................
How did you decide the final amount of money that you sent back to the other participants? *
(Feel free to choose more than one answer if any of the following fits.)
No particular reason. I decided the amount of money quite randomly.
I decided the amount based on who were the friends that could link me to the lenders.
D I decided based on how many steps the lenders could be connected to me.
I decided based on my investment outcome.
I decided based on the amount of money sent from the lenders.
D Other:
Were you aware that you could maximize your profit if you choose not to return the money
from the other participant? *
(Were you aware during the process when you played, not now)
o No, I was not aware of this.
0 Yes, I found this from the instructions
) Yes, I thought about this but not from the instructions.
(if yes..) You were aware that you could maximize your profit by not returning the money to the
other participant. Does it influence your repayment decision?
0 No, I still payback the full amount or more.
0 Yes, I think it is smart to pay back less and I did.
0 I'm not sure. I just paid back as I felt like.
(If you selected "yes" or "I'm not sure" in the previous question....) You were aware that you
can maximize your profit by not paying back, why did you still pay back?
Submit
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APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL TO USE HUMANS AS EXPERIMENTAL
SUBJECTS (STANDARD FORM)
Please answer every question. Positive answers should be ampified with details. You must mark N/A where
the question does not pertain to your application. Any incomplete application will be rejected and returned
for completion. A completed CHECKLIST FOR STANDARD APPLICA TION FORM must accompany
this application.
I. BASIC INFORMATION
1. Title of Study
How Perception of Social Connection Influences Trust Behavior and Personal Decision
2. Principal Investigator
Name: Deb Roy Building and Room #: E15-483
Title: Professor of Media Arts and Email: dkroy@media.mit.edu
Sciences; Director of Center for Future
Banking
Department: Media Lab Phone:
3. Study Personnel
All key personnel1 including the PI must be listed below, with a brief statement of
qualifications and study role(s).
Important Note: all key personnel are required to complete Human Subject training
before work begins on the project.
Investigators and other Qualifications: Describe Study role(s): (Check
personnel [and briefly box to the right if
institution(s)]: person will be
obtaining consent.)
Deb Roy Faculty Principal investigator l
Sheng-Ying (Aithne) Pao Graduate student Associate Investigator E]
Peter Rigano Undergraduate student UROP L
Jorge Simosa
Wendy Cheang
4. Collaborating Institutions. Ifyou are collaborating with another institution(s) then you must
obtain approval from that institution's institutional review board, and forward copies of the approval to
COUHES)
'MIT key personnel all individuals who contribute in a substantive way to the execution and monitoring of
the study at or on behalf of MIT or affiliated institutions. Typically, these individuals have doctoral or other
professional degrees, although other individuals may be included. In particular, investigators and staff
involved in obtaining informed consent are considered key personnel.
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5. Location of Research. If at MIT please indicate where on campus. Ifyou plan to use the facilities
of the Clinical Research Center you will need to obtain the approval of the CRC Advisory Committee. You
may use this form for simultaneous submission to the CRC Advisory Committee.
Behavioral Research Lab
6. Funding. If the research isfunded by an outside sponsor, please enclose one copy of the research
proposal with your application. A draft ofthe research proposal is acceptable.
A. Type of funding: B. Source of funding
F1 Contract/Grant []Federal Government
E] Subcontract []Other Gov. (e.g. State, local)
F] Departmental []Industry
F] Gift []Other Private
L] Other: l Departmental Funds
n No Funding LI Other:
Have funds been awarded? Specify name of source designated above:
L Yes L Pending F] No
Award #, if known
C. If Contract of Grant
Name of Contrc or Grant: Contract or Grant Title:
Contract or Grant Number: OSP#:
7. Human Subjects Training. All study personnel MUST take and pass a training course on
human subjects research. MIT has a web-based course that can be accessed from the main menu of the
COUHES web site. COUHES may accept proof of training from some other institutions. List the names of
all study personnel and indicate if they have taken a human subjects training course.
Sheng-Ying (Aithne) Pao - completed
Peter Rigano - completed
Jorge Simosa - completed
Wendy Cheang- completed
Deb Roy - completed
8. Anticipated Dates of Research
Start Date: Jun. 20, 2009 Completion Date: Jun. 20, 2010
1. STUDY INFORMATION
1. Purpose of Study. Please provide a concise statement of the background, nature and reasons for the
proposed study. Use non-technical language that can be understood by non-scientist members of COUHES.
This is a pilot study to examine how social connection and the perception of social
network influences trust and decision making. We aim to understand how trust between
participants who do not know each other is influenced by the factors of how they
perceive each other, based on the social information about people who connect them, and
how this social perception in turn influences their trust behavior and personal decisions.
2. Study Protocol. For biomedica, engineering and related research, please provide an outline of
the actual experiments to be performed. Where applicable, provide a detailed description of the
experimental devices or procedures to be used, detailed information on the exact dosages of drugs or
chemicals to be used, total quantity of blood samples to be used, and descriptions of special diets.
For applications in the social sciences, management and other non-biomedical disciplines
please provide a detailed description ofyour proposed study. Where applicable, include copies of any
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questionnaires or standardized tests you plan to incorporate into your study. Ifyour study involves
interviews please submit an outline indicating the types of questions you will include.
You should provide sufficient information for effective review by non-scientist members of
COUHES. Define all abbreviations and use simple words. Unless just ication is provided this part of the
application must not exceed 5 pages.
Attaching sections of a grant application is not an acceptable substitute.
Subjects who are qualified for this experiment would be people who connect and interact
with other people on social networking websites such as Facebook.
On the first day, they will first provide the information about their social network on the
networking website, given their consent. They will be required to finish a social relation
survey on a computer to specify and rate their relationships to people they are connected
to, from which three categories of relationship will be identified. The three categories are
possitive relatonship, negative relationship, and neutral relationship. People they trust and
care a lot about are categorized into positive relationship. People they avoid or distrust
are categorized into negative relationship. People they do not care about are categorized
into neutral relationship. The information will be used to construct a half-genuine social
connection map of how they connect to the other subject they do not know. One day
after, they will participate in a "two-way trust game", in which the social connection map
will be displayed before they play.
The experiment will include two settings. In the first setting, we will pair up subjects
randomly, under the only condition that they do not know each other directly. Each pair
of subjects will first be endowed with $10 and play the "p2p lending game" against each
other. In the game, player 1 (lender) is required to decide the amount of money send to
Player 2. Player 2 is required to use the money borrowed from player one to make an
investment decision from two options. The investment outcome decides the total amount
of money that Player 2 will have. After that, Player 2 decides the amount of money return
to Player 1.
Their names will be encrypted, so they do not know who they are playing the game with.
We'll also send them a list of names before they come and make sure they do not know
the people on the list. They will play the game with people they do not know, and the
only information they have about the other person is how they are connected in their
social network. To do this, we mine their social network based on the results of the social
relation survey. Before they play the game, they will see the social connection map. The
map illustrates their relationship to the other player, such as who their common friend is,
or they do not have common friends. Their common friends on the map will be names
and pictures picked from one of the three categories of relationship we mined from the
survey results.
In the second setting of the experimient, subjects will play a card-guessing game. In this
game they will see three cards facing down, and they are told that one of the cards is a
joker (or a specific card) -- the target card. The player who can guess the right card will
win 50 points, the other would gain nothing. If both of them guess it right, they will share
the 50 points. If both of them guess it wrong, both gain nothing. Before they make a
guess, each of them is presented with one of the cards other than the target card, but none
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of them know which one is the targt card, or which card has been presented to the other
player. The only thing each player knows is the card they've seen is not the target card.
Next, they are required to guess which one is the target card, and other person can choose
to agree or disagree. They can choose to cooperate with the other player by telling the
truth, or choose to preventing the other player from sharing the prize by telling a lie. They
will see the social connection maps as mentioned above before playing the game.
Subjects are told that they are playing with the other subjects and that the map shows how
theya are socially connected, but for conducting and controlling the treatment in the
experiments, we may have computers play the role of the other participant, playing the
game against the subjects. After the game, they will be clearly informed that whether they
play with computers and that the social connection map is half-genuine. If they play with
a human, we will not reveal who they play the game with, and will not reveal their real
connections.
For each subject, $10 payment for the survey is ensured, but the total amount of payment
will be decided by their performance in the games they play.
They will have to finish a short questionnaire about their experience during the game and
about demographics. Through their behavior and their self-report questionnaires, to
investigate the strategy they take in the game and to see whether their behaviour is
influenced by factors other than social connections.
3. Drugs and Devices. If the study involves the administration of an investigational drug that is not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the use outlined in the protocol, then the principa
investigator (or sponsor) must obtain an Investigational New Drug (IND) number from the FDA. If the study
involves the use of an approved drug in an unapproved way the investigator (or sponsor) must submit an
application for an IND number. Please attach a copy of the IND approval (new drug), or application (new
use.).
If the study involves the use of an investigational medical device and CO UHES determines the device poses
significant risk to human subjects, the investigator (or sponsor) must obtain an Investigational Device and
Equipment (IDE) number from the FDA.
Will drugs or biological agents requiring an IND be used? YESLI NON
Ifyes, please provide details:
Will an investigational medical device be used? YESLI NOZ
Ifyes, please provide details:
4. Radiation If the study uses radiation or radioactive materials it may also have to be approved by
the Committee on Radiation Exposure to Human Subjects (COREHS). COUHES will determine ifyou need
COREHS approval.
Will radiation or radioactive materials be used? YES[:] NOZ
Ifyes, please provide details:
5. Diets
Will special diets be used? YES[: NON
Ifyes, please provide details:
III. HUMAN SUBJECTS
1. Subjects
A. Estimated number: 100 B. Age(s): 18 or older
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C. Inclusion/exclusion criteria
i. What are the criteria for inclusion or exclusion?
Subjects have to be connected and interact with other people on social
networking websites such as Facebook.
ii. Are any inclusion or exclusion criteria based on age, gender, or
race/ethnic origin? Ifso, please explain and justify
no
D. Please explain the inclusion of any vulnerable population (e.g. children,
cognitively impaired persons, non-English speakers, MIT students), and why that
population is being studied.
2. Subject recruitment Identification and recruitment of subjects must be ethically and legally
acceptable and free of coercion. Describe below what methods will be used to identify and recruit subjects
Subjects will be recruited through a variety of standard techniques. We may post notices
to internal M.I.T. subject recruitment lists, and announce the study on appropriate
Internet discussion groups.
Please attach a copy of any advertisements/ notices and letters to potential subjects
3. Subject compensation Payment must be reasonable in relation to the time and trouble associated
with participating in the study. It cannot constitute an undue inducement to participate
Describe all plans to pay subjects in cash or other form of payment (i.e. gift
certificate)
cash
Will subjects be reimbursed for travel and expenses?
no additional reimbusement
4. Potential risks. A risk is a potential harm that a reasonable person would consider important in
deciding whether to participate in research. Risks can be categorized as physical, psychological,
sociological, economic and legal, and include pain, stress, invasion ofprivacy, embarrassment or exposure
of sensitive or confidential data. All potential risks and discomforts must be minimized to the greatest extent
possible by using e.g. appropriate monitoring, safety devices and withdrawal ofa subject if there is evidence
of a specific adverse event.
What are the risks / discomforts associated with each intervention or procedure in
the study?
There is no significant physical or psychological risk to participation.
What procedures will be in place to prevent / minimize potential risks or
discomfort?
5. Potential benefits
What potential benefits may subjects receive from participating in the study?
They will receive cash payment, and will potentially learn more about their social network
and their decision-making process.
What potential benefits can society expect from the study?
This study will help the science and society to deeper understand human decision making
process and the influenced by social network.
6. Data collection, storage, and confidentiality
How will data be collected?
Data will be collected from subjects' input on computers.
Is there audio or videotaping? YES LI NOE Explain the procedures you plan tofollow.
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Will data be associated with personal identifiers or will it be coded?
Personal identifiers l Coded 0 Explain the procedures you plan to follow.
Where will the data be stored and how will it be secured?
All the personal information, research data, and related records will be stored in an
encrypted file to prevent access by unauthorized personnel. Only the results of analysis for
this study will be reported.
What will happen to the data when the study is completed?
Subjects' personal information will not be reported in any form and will be destroyed
following analysis.
Can data acquired in the study affect a subject's relationship with other individuals
(e.g. employee-supervisor, patient -physician, student-teacher, family relationships)?
No.
7. Deception Investigators must not exclude information from a subject that a reasonable person would
want to know in deciding whether to participate in a study.
Will information about the research purpose and design be withheld from subjects?
YES 0 NO[: If so, explain and justify.
The research purpose and design will be withheld to prevent any potential influence on
their behavior about trust and decision making. Once the experiment is done, they will be
clearly informed about the research purpose and design. Please see study protocal for
details.
8. Adverse effects. Serious or unexpected adverse reactions or injuries must be reported to COUHES
within 48 hours. Other adverse events should be reported within 10 working days.
What follow-up efforts will be made to detect any harm to subjects and how will
COUHES be kept informed?
no follow-up
9. Informed consent. Documented informed consent must be obtained from all participants in studies
that involve human subjects. You must use the templates available on the COUHES web-site to prepare
these forms. Draft informed consent forms must be returned with this application. Under certain
circumstances COUHES may waive the requirement for informed consent.
Attach informed consent forms with this application.
10. The HIPAA Privacy Rule. Ifyour study involves disclosing identifiable health information about
a subject outside ofM I.T., then you must conform to the HIPAA Privacy Rule and complete the questions
below. Please refer to the HIPAA section, and to the definitions ofprotected health information, de-identifiec
data and limited data set on the COUHES web-site.
Do you plan to use or disclose identifiable health information outside M.I.T.?
YES [I NON
If YES, then the subject must complete an Authorization for Release of Protected Health Information Form.
Please attach a copy of this draft form. You must use the template available on the COUHES web-site.
Alternatively, COUHES may grant a Waiver ofAuthorization if the disclosure meets criteria outlined on
the COUHES web-site.
Are you requesting a Waiver of Authorization?
YES El NOFl
If YES, explain and justify.
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Will the health information you plan to use or disclose be de-identified?
YES F NOEl
Will you be using or disclosing a limited data set?
YES E1 NOD
If YES, then COUHES will send you aformal data use agreement that you must complete in order for your
application to be approved
IV. INVESTIGATOR'S ASSURANCE
I certify the information provided in this application is complete and correct
I understand that I have ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the study, the
ethical performance of the project, the protection of the rights and welfare of human
subjects, and strict adherence to any stipulations imposed by COUHES
I agree to comply with all MIT policies, as well all federal, state and local laws on the
protection of human subjects in research, including:
* ensuring all study personnel satisfactorily complete human subjects training
* performing the study according to the approved protocol
* implementing no changes in the approved study without COUHES approval
* obtaining informed consent from subjects using only the currently approved
consent form
* protecting identifiable health information in accord with the HIPAA Privacy
Rule
* promptly reporting significant or untoward adverse effects
Signature of Principal Investigator Date
Print Full Name and Title
Signature of Department Head Date
Print Full Name and Title
Please return 3 hard copies of this application (1 with original signatures) to the
COUHES office E25-143b.
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
NON-BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Decisions of Networking Website Users.
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Sheng-Ying Pao (M.S.), Peter Rigano, Jorge
Simosa, Wendy Cheang and Deb Roy (Ph.D.), from the Media Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M.I.T.). The results will be contributed to thesis in the Media Lab. You were selected as a
possible participant in this study because You (1) are a Facebook user and (2) allow us to incorporate your
social network data on Facebookfor the study. You should read the information below, and ask questions
about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to participate.
e PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to choose whether to be in it or not.
If you choose to be in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at any time without penalty or
consequences of any kind. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise
which warrant doing so.
If the information you provided about your social relationship is not true or the number of connections you
have on the website is not enough for the study, your participation may be terminated by the investigator
without regard to your consent.
o PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study is to analyze social interaction and personal decision-making.
* PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things:
You will be required to finish a survey on a computer involving your Facebook friends. You will be playing a
game on a computer with another subject who you have never met before, followed by a questionnaire about
demographics.
The total length of this study will be about 60 minutes, about 30 minutes for Part 1 and about 30 minutes for
Part 2. You will play the game in MIT Behavioral Research Lab on a computer.
* POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There is no signficant physical or psychological risk to participation
e POTENTIAL BENEFITS
This study will help the science and society to deeper understand social interaction and human decision
making.
* PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
Your total payment is based on your performance in the experiment. You will earn dollars in chips and use
the chips when you play. You could gain more or less chips based on your decisions and performance. Chips
will be exchanged into cash at the end of Part 2. Payment will be made after you finish both part 1 and Part
2.
* CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law.
Your personal information, reactions in the experiment, and related records will be stored in an
encrypted file to prevent access by unauthorized personnel. Only the results of analysis for this study will
be reported. Your information and responses in the experiment will not be reported in any form and will
be destroyed following analysis.
. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the Facebook
Experiment Team [(617) 715-4435, studya@mit.edu]
* EMERGENCY CARE AND COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
If you feel you have suffered an injury, which may include emotional trauma, as a result of participating in
this study, please contact the person in charge of the study as soon as possible.
In the event you suffer such an injury, M.I.T. may provide itself, or arrange for the provision of, emergency
transport or medical treatment, including emergency treatment and follow-up care, as needed, or
reimbursement for such medical services. M.I.T. does not provide any other form of compensation for injury.
In any case, neither the offer to provide medical assistance, nor the actual provision of medical services shall
be considered an admission of fault or acceptance of liability. Questions regarding this policy may be
directed to MIT's Insurance Office, (617) 253-2823. Your insurance carrier may be billed for the cost of
emergency transport or medical treatment, if such services are determined not to be directly related to your
participation in this study.
. RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.
If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject,
you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T.,
Room E25-143B, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253 6787.
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my
agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
satisfaction, and I
Name of Subject
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable)
Signature of Subject or Legal Representative Date
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
In my judgment the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent and possesses the legal
capacity to give informed consent to participate in this research study.
Signature of Investigator Date
T Committee On the Use of Humans asMIT Experimental Subjects MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY77 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Building E 25-1438
(817) 253-6787
Deb Roy
E15-488
Leigh Fim, Chair
COUHES
06/22/2009
Committee Action:
COUHES Protocol #:
Study Title:
Expiration Date:
Expedited Approval
0905003236
How Perception of Social Connection Influences Trust Behavior and Personal
Decision
06/21/2010
The above-referenced protocol was approved following expedited review by the Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES).
If the research involves collaboration with another institution then the research cannot commence until COUHES
receives written notification of approval from the collaborating institution's IRB.
It is the Principal Investigator's responsibility to obtain review and continued approval before the expiration
date. You may not continue any research activity beyond the expiration date without approval by COUHES.
Failure to renew your study before the expiration date will result in termination of the study and suspension of
related research grants.
Adverse Events: Any serious or unexpected adverse event must be reported to COUHES within 48 hours. All
other adverse events should be reported in writing within 10 working days.
Amendments: Any changes to the protocol that impact human subjects, including changes in experimental
design, equipment, personnel or funding, must be approved by COUHES before they can be initiated.
Prospecitve new study personnel must, where applicable, complete training in human subjects research and in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule before participating in the study.
COUHES should be notified when your study is completed. You must maintain a research file for at least 3
years after completion of the study. This file should include all correspondence with COUHES, original signed
consent forms, and study data.
To:
From:
Date:
/If !A

Appendix G
Subject Recruiting Advertisement
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Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009a@
qmail.com
Or sign up at htto://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009O@
qmail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009@
gmail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009aqm
ail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009cDqmail.com
Or sign up at htp://web.m
it.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009@
qamail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a
 Game!
Email: studya2009(qmail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/br/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009cgm
ail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009(gmail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studva2009gm
ail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
Facebook users: Come Play a Game!
Email: studya2009a-qm
ail.com
Or sign up at http://web.mit.edu/brl/
